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CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION (RESEARCH PROPOSAL) 
 
1.1 RESEARCH TOPIC 
 
To what extent does the condition in the African Growth Opportunity Act, 2000 requiring 
that Sub-Saharan African countries eliminate barriers to United States of America trade, 
lend itself to abuse at the instance of the USA? 
 
1.2 BACKGROUND, THE POSITION OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WITHIN THE 
MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM 
In the context of international trade, historically developing countries have been placed 
on an un-even playing field, due to their lack of trade capacity, expertise and limited 
resources. Adding to this, developing countries’ desire to form part of the mainstream 
trade community has condemned developing countries to only average results.2 
Historically, discussions and negotiations between developed countries and developing 
countries can be traced back to the International Trade Organisation (ITO) negotiations. 
The ITO Charter – the Proposed Charter contained no special rules or exceptions for 
developing countries, in this regard the United States of America (USA) proposed that the 
special rules or exceptions for developing countries be contained in the Economic 
Development Sub-Commission of the United Nations Social Council3. The USA submitted 
a draft resolution to the Economic and Social Council for it to convene the ITO 
negotiations. In this resolution, no mention was made of any special rules or exceptions 
for developing countries.4 When the UN Economic and Social Council responded to the 
draft resolution that it had received from the USA, it requested an amendment to the 
                                                          
2Hudec. R. ‘Developing Countries in the GATT / WTO Legal System’. Cordell Hull Institute, Washington, D.C. 
Page 20. 1987. 
3Ibid (fn 2). 
4Ibid (fn 2). 
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resolution so that it would include the following wording5  
‘[t]ake into account the special conditions which prevail in countries whose 
manufacturing industry is still in the initial stages of development’. 
The USA ignored the proposed amendment made by the Economic and Social Council and 
then in later months, the USA published a more detailed resolution which was called the 
‘Suggested Charter’, but the wording specific to developing countries was still absent.6 
The USA therefore, showed early signs of apathy towards developing countries and their 
so-called ‘special needs’, and this is illustrated by their actions building up to the ITO 
negotiations. 
To be exact, developing countries wanted the following out of the ITO negotiations: 
 ‘protection of infant industries, with measures that were not recognized and hence not 
available; 
 receiving new tariff preferences from other developed or developing countries7; and  
 The right to benefit from developed country tariff concessions without having to offer 
equivalent tariff concessions of their own’. 
The USA opposed the position of the developing countries and was of the view that the 
special rules or exceptions allegedly required by developing countries would only serve to 
promote the creation of inefficient local industries.8 Unlike the USA, the United Kingdom 
(UK) and France were of the view that market distortions in the form of special rules or 
exceptions were needed to help developing countries.9 It must be pointed out that the 
UK and France’s view were probably only aided by the fact that they both wanted to retain 
their own preferential tariff regimes.10 The UK and France also both wished to use 
protection and discrimination to foster the process of post-war economic 
reconstruction.11 The divergence between the USA, the UK and France illustrates that the 
                                                          
5 Hudec. R. ‘Developing Countries in the GATT / WTO Legal System’. Cordell Hull Institute, Washington, D.C. 
Page 21. 1987. 
6Ibid (fn 5). 
7Hudec. R. ‘Developing Countries in the GATT / WTO Legal System’. Cordell Hull Institute, Washington, D.C. 
Page 22. 1987. 
8Ibid (fn 7). 
9Ibid (fn 7). 
10Ibid (fn 7). 
11Ibid (fn 7). 
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developed world had differing views on whether policy should recognise the special needs 
of developing countries.  
The ITO Charter was not accepted and therefore, the more extensive legal privileges 
developing countries had gained during the ITO negotiations did not materialise.12 
However, this would only have limited adverse effects because the trade policy rules of 
the ITO would survive and resonate in the General Agreement Trade and Tariffs (GATT).13 
GATT incorporated the ITO Charter’s infant-industry exceptions for tariffs and 
quantitative import restrictions and thus, it can be said that developing countries 
succeeded in gaining recognition for the legitimacy of their basic argument which from 
the onset was that the special needs of developing countries justified recognition and 
reliance on ITO-GATT legal dispensation.14 The recognition of developing countries’ basic 
argument was of utmost importance because this argument would feature with even 
more rigour in future trade policy discussions and subsequent inquiries. 
During the GATT meeting of Ministers convened in November 1957 with the objective of 
considering the general state of and prospects of international trade, the Minister’s 
decision cited the following three major concerns: 
 ‘the failure of the trade of less developed countries to develop as rapidly as that of 
developed countries; 
 excessive short-term fluctuations in prices of primary products; and 
 widespread resort to agricultural protection’.15 
 
In 1958, the Ministers commissioned a group of experts to look into the concerns noted 
in the 1957 meeting of Ministers. The findings of the group of experts culminated in the 
Haberler Report.16 The main findings of the Haberler Report pointed out that the export 
earnings of developing countries were unsatisfactory and not at the level required to 
                                                          
12Hudec. R. ‘Developing Countries in the GATT / WTO Legal System’. Cordell Hull Institute, Washington, D.C. 
Page 24. 1987. 
13Ibid (fn 12). 
14Hudec. R. ‘Developing Countries in the GATT / WTO Legal System’. Cordell Hull Institute, Washington, D.C, 
page 25. 1987. 
15Hudec. R. ‘Developing Countries in the GATT / WTO Legal System’. Cordell Hull Institute, Washington, D.C, 
page 43. 1987. 
16Trends in International Trade, October 1958, Sales No. GATT/1958-3. Also known as the ‘Haberler Report’ 
after Gottfried Haberler, its chairman. The other Panel members were Roberto da Oliveira Campos, James 
Meade, and Jan Tinbergen. 
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foster economic development.17 The Haberler Report also focused on the need to open 
markets of developed countries so that developing countries could have easier access to 
these markets and thereby, improve on their export earnings.18 The findings of the 
Haberler Report were crucial because they added substance to the arguments that were 
at all times made by developing countries in relation to their special circumstances and 
needs. 
The Haberler Report culminated into the Action Programme which had as one of its main 
objectives the expansion of developing countries’ export earnings.19 In order to achieve 
this objective, the Action Programme needed to focus on ensuring that developed 
countries did not insist on much reciprocity and conceded to unilateral trade liberalization 
without negotiation and reciprocity.20 Currently, in modern international trade law, non-
reciprocity is still recognized as being important and necessary from the perspective of 
developing countries, but this principle is still causing much debate and discomfort among 
developed countries, on the basis that it is against the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
principle of trade liberalization. 
The above discussion or information illustrates that developing countries started-off trade 
negotiations with a very poor negotiating posture, but over the years and through more 
negotiations, discussions and investigations, the negotiating posture of developing 
countries would improve and indeed become quite attractive as evidenced in 
international trading instruments such as GATT, the WTO and African Growth Opportunity 
Act (AGOA). 
                                                          
17Ibid (fn 15). 
18Ibid (fn 15). 
19Ibid (fn 15). 
20Hudec. R. ‘Developing Countries in the GATT / WTO Legal System’. Cordell Hull Institute, Washington, D.C, 
page 44. 1987. 
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1.3 BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO AGOA 
The USA Congress passed AGOA and it was signed by the then president, Bill Clinton. Title 
I is entitled, ‘African Growth and Opportunity Act’ and the purpose of AGOA is to grant 
preferential trade treatment to certain products originating in eligible SSA countries, for 
a limited period.21 
The pertinent parts of Section 103 of AGOA22outlines the statement of policy as being 
Congresses’ support towards: 
‘encouraging increased trade and investment between the United States and sub-
Saharan Africa; 
reducing tariff and nontariff barriers and other obstacles to sub-Saharan African and 
United States trade; 
expanding United States assistance to sub-Saharan Africa’s regional integration 
efforts; 
negotiating reciprocal and mutually beneficial trade agreements, including the 
possibility of establishing free trade areas that serve the interests of both the United 
States and the countries of sub-Saharan Africa; 
focusing on countries committed to the rule of law, economic reform, and eradication 
of poverty’. 
‘AGOA authorises the President of the USA to grant reforming sub-Saharan African 
countries duty-free access to the USA market in respect of 1800 items, which is in addition 
to the 4600 products contained under the GSP offered to other developing countries’.23 
This thesis will look into the following conditionality requirements that must be met in 
order for SSA countries to qualify for AGOA eligibility: 
 ‘the elimination of barriers to United States trade and investment, including by –  
                                                          
21Bhala, R. ‘The Limits of American Generosity’, Fordham International Law Journal, page 310. Volume 29. 
22Section 103 (Statement of Policy), 19 U.S.C 3702. The African Growth and Opportunity Act, 2000. 
23Fuhr D. and Klughaupt Z., ‘The IMF and AGOA: A Comparative Analysis of Conditionality’. Duke Journal of 
Comparative and International Law. Volume 14:125. Page 137. 2004. 
11 
 
 the provision of national treatment and measures to create an environment conducive 
to domestic and foreign investment; 
 the protection of intellectual property; and 
 the resolution of bilateral trade and investment disputes’.24  
In academic literature the above conditions have been criticized for not being 
commercially viable and only setting out to achieve the narrow interest of the USA.25 On 
a reading of section 104 of AGOA,26 this thesis argues that section 104 (1)(C) (Eligibility 
Requirements)27 appears out of touch with the manifest purpose of the remainder of 
section 104 of AGOA.28 To elaborate on this point, the remainder of section 104 of AGOA 
confines itself to what appear to be reasonable expectations of reform, compliance with 
the rule of law, compliance with internationally recognized labour standards and 
economic policies aimed at reducing poverty.29 These arguments will be elaborated in the 
dissertation. 
 
1.4 BACKGROUND TO THE USA AND SA POULTRY DISPUTE 
The trade dispute between the USA and South Africa (SA), in the context of the poultry 
industry has its roots in the anti-dumping duties that SA (referred to as the Duties, in this 
thesis), acting through the SA Board on Tariffs and Trade (BTT) imposed on US poultry in 
1999.30 In 1999, the SA BTT initiated a case against the USA, for selling poultry below fair 
value.31 One of the contentious points needing to be addressed as part of the matter was 
how the prices for dark meat and white meat, respectively, in relation to chickens for 
export were to be calculated. As could have been reasonably expected, the USA used a 
                                                          
24Section 104(1)(C)(iii) (Eligibility Requirements), 19 U.S.C 3703. The African Growth and Opportunity Act, 2000. 
25Bhala, R. ‘The Limits of American Generosity’, Fordham International Law Journal, Volume 29, Issue 2. Page 
334-335. 2006. 
26Section 104(1)(C) (Eligibility Requirements), 19 U.S.C 3703. The African Growth and Opportunity Act, 2000. 
27Section 104(1)(C) (Eligibility Requirements), 19 U.S.C 3703. The African Growth and Opportunity Act, 2000. 
28Section 104 (Eligibility Requirements), 19 U.S.C 3703. The African Growth and Opportunity Act, 2000. 
29Sections 104 (1)(A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F), section 104(2) and section 104(3), 19 U.S.C 3703. The African Growth 
and Opportunity Act, 2000. 
30Mankiw G., and Swagel P.L., ‘Anti-dumping: the third rail of trade policy’. Foreign Affairs. Volume 84(4). Page 
107-119. 2005. 
31Mankiw G., and Swagel P.L., ‘Anti-dumping: the third rail of trade policy’. Foreign Affairs. Volume 84(4). 
Paragraph 115. 2005. 
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formula that it was familiar with, likewise, SA used a formula that it was familiar with.32 
The SA BTT found that two USA exporters of chicken were involved in the dumping of dark 
chicken, by margins of 209 percent and 357 percent, respectively.33 It is submitted that as 
a result of the SA BTT findings, the US chicken export numbers fell to 307 000 US Dollars 
in 2001 which was calculated to be a decline of 80 percent.34 
From the perspective of the USA, the Duties have been contentious for two primary 
reasons. Firstly, the Duties hinder the USA poultry industry, the largest in the world.35 
Secondly, In the light of the AGOA benefits of which SA is a beneficiary of, it is argued that 
SA should be relaxing its anti-dumping duties in accordance with AGOA conditionality 
requirements. SA has been benefitting under AGOA since the year 2000, being granted 
the privilege of exporting, duty-free, products such as wines, nuts, fruits and 
automobiles.36 
From SA’s perspective, the views are that the duties levelled at the USA poultry industry 
are necessary in order to protect SA’s own poultry industry.37 SA also relies on the WTO 
anti-dumping measures, which allow countries to impose levies on a product if that 
product is introduced into a market at less than normal value.38 The perspectives of the 
USA and SA have culminated into a dead-lock, with neither party willing to give-into what 
are in its views, rational policy positions. This deadlock is deserving of closer attention and 
raises various important issues. One important matter is whether SA should cease to 
protect its own poultry industry, through using internationally recognized measures such 
as the anti-dumping measures of the WTO, simply because the USA is not in agreement 
with such a move?  
                                                          
32Mankiw G., and Swagel P.L., ‘Anti-dumping: the third rail of trade policy’. Foreign Affairs. Volume 84(4). 
Paragraph 116. 2005. 
33Ibid (fn 32). 
34Ibid (fn 32). 
35Kulkarini, k., ‘Anti-Dumping Law as a trade barrier: a case of South-African poultry imports from U.S.A’. The 
Indian Journal of Economics. Page 6. 2005. 
36Schneidman W. and Lewis Z.A, ‘The African Growth Opportunity Act: Looking back, looking forward’. Africa 
Growth Initiative Brookings Institution. Page 33. 2012. 
37Ncube P., ‘Development of the animal feed to poultry value chain across Botswana, South Africa, and 
Zimbabwe’. United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research. Page 15. 2016. 
38Article 2 (Determination of Dumping) of the Agreement on Implementation of Article IV of the General 




It is concerning when the USA believes it’s at liberty to prevent a developing country from 
using entrenched rights, it becomes problematic and begins to meddle with the very 
essence of an international trade law system. On this point, it is interesting to note that 
one of the conditions in AGOA, speaks directly to the issue of removing all barriers to USA 
trade, and this seems to have been a well thought out strategy by the USA. This condition 
will be discussed at length in the thesis.  
 
1.5 THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISSERTATION 
The purpose of this dissertation is to critically analyse some of the conditionality 
requirements outlined in AGOA and whether the enforcement of these has lent itself to 
abuse at the instance of the USA. 
Whether the conditionality requirements have lent themselves to abuse matters, because 
if they have, they will likely continue to do so in years to come which could possibly harm 
the future prospects of US and SA trade. If the conditionality requirements in AGOA lend 
themselves to abuse, then this also necessitates closer scrutiny of conditionality 
requirements, in unilateral trade agreements, and the deletion of conditions that serve 
no legitimate purpose other than to solely advance the narrow interests of USA trade. 
 
1.6 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
General research question 
‘To what extent does the condition in the African Growth Opportunity Act, 2000 requiring 
that Sub-Saharan African countries eliminate barriers to United States of America trade, 
lend itself to abuse at the instance of the USA?’ 
Chapter 2 – ‘The history of GATT and the WTO and the uneven positions of the developed 
countries and the developing countries in international trade’. 
Chapter 2 – Research questions: 
14 
 
 ‘What is the policy position of developing countries in the context of international 
trade law?; 
 ‘What are the stated challenges faced by developing countries?; 
  ‘Have the stated challenges of developing countries been given recognition in 
any international trade law instruments?; 
 ‘How has the international community responded to the needs of developing 
countries?’ 
 
Chapter 3 – ‘The history of the trade relationship between SA and USA and USA and SSA 
countries and analysis of AGOA’. 
Chapter 3 – Research questions: 
 ‘From a policy perspective, what is the nature of the relationship between the USA 
and SA?; 
 ‘From a policy perspective, what is the nature of the relationship between the USA 
and SSA countries?; 
 ‘Has the trade relationship between the USA and SA been formalized?; 
 ‘Are there any noticeable trade disputes between the USA and SA?’ 
 ‘What is the legal nature of AGOA?; 
 ‘From the perspective of the USA, what is the policy stance of AGOA?; 
 ‘What are the eligibility criteria of AGOA?; 
 ‘Are the eligibility criteria rational?’ 
 
Chapter 4 – ‘Recommendations and Conclusions’ 
Chapter 4 – Research questions: 
 ‘Is AGOA entirely generous?; 
 ‘Is AGOA fair and reasonable from the perspective of international trade?; 
 ‘Are there other ways in which the USA through AGOA can achieve its stated policy 
objectives?; 
 ‘Are there any reasonable amendments that can be made to AGOA?’ 
15 
 
1.7 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Bhala is of the view that generosity39 in the context of international trade does matter.40 
It is submitted that if generosity in the context of international trade law does matter, 
then it ought to be preserved and not dressed up as something else that is not in line with 
what generosity stands for, such as narrow self-interests.41  
Remarking specifically on the AGOA conditionality requirements, Bhala states that, ‘It is 
not difficult to mount a case that the AGOA eligibility requirements are self-interested, 
indeed nakedly so’.42 If one considers the AGOA conditionality requirements and the 
poultry dispute between the USA and SA, it appears reasonably clear that these 
requirements only have as their objective, the removal of SA’s anti-dumping measures 
levelled at USA poultry. Accepting that AGOA is a unilateral preference trade programme 
that does not require reciprocity at the instance of the beneficiary countries, it appears 
contradictory that AGOA requires SSAs to eliminate all barriers to, ‘USA trade and 
investment, including national treatment of foreign investors and the protection of 
intellectual property rights’.43 It also does not follow that AGOA requires SA to eliminate 
all barriers to USA trade and investment, such as anti-dumping measures, 
notwithstanding their legal recognition at the level of the WTO.44 Considering Bhala’s 
views and my observations in light of the USA poultry dispute, the AGOA conditionality 
requirements have lent themselves to abuse at the instance of the USA. 
Bhala suggests that generosity granted by developed countries to developing countries 
might even lead to a dispensation in the context of international trade where developing 
countries become wholly dependent on developed countries. Bhala’s reasoning is that 
under preferential trade programmes, developing countries are often required to make 
                                                          
39 In his works, ‘The Limits of American Generosity’. Fordham International Law Journal, Volume 29, Issue 2 (page 
299) (2005), Bhala R. cites from the Oxford American Dictionary, synonyms for the word ‘generosity’. Some of 
the synonyms are as follows: ‘1. Giving or given freely. 2. Magnanimous; noble-minded; unprejudiced. 3. Ample; 
abundant; copious. 4. Bountiful, charitable, lavish, openhanded, free, liberal, unstinting, ungrudging…’ 
40Bhala, R. ‘The Limits of American Generosity’, Fordham International Law Journal, Volume 29, Issue 2. Page 
301. 2006. 
41Bhala, R. ‘The Limits of American Generosity’, Fordham International Law Journal, Volume 29, Issue 2. Page 
334-335. 2006. 
42Bhala, R. ‘The Limits of American Generosity’, Fordham International Law Journal, Volume 29, Issue. Page 331. 
2006. 
43Ibid (fn 24). 
44Agreement on Implementation of Article IV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994. See Article 2 
(determination of dumping). 
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‘market based reforms’45 that they may not be ready for. Stated differently, developing 
countries may be required to adopt market based reforms that fail to adequately protect 
the infant markets of developing countries. 
The dependency argument substantiates this thesis argument that the AGOA 
conditionality requirements may lend themselves to abuse at the instance of the USA. 
Furthermore, if the spirit of generosity is adhered to, then developing countries should 
not be required to make market reforms, all in the name of being eligible for AGOA 
benefits. 
The Haberler Report found that developing countries were experiencing challenges in the 
context of International trade, due to their dependence on primary products and the 
import barriers that are prevalent on developed country’s shores.46 Also, of great 
significance, the Haberler Report found that developing country’s export earnings were 
insufficient to foster their economic development. Although the Haberler Report didn’t 
express itself on these terms, it implied that developing countries needed to be afforded 
the opportunity to protect their markets while at the same time improving on their export 
earnings. The result of all of this would be economic development. In support of the 
argument immediately above, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment 
(UNCTE) stated that47: 
‘the high degree of economic development attained by certain countries has been in 
no small measure due to the use of tariffs and other regulatory devices; and it is only 
proper that the use of these instruments should not be denied to countries that have 
just started on the path of development’. 
The statement of the UNCTE legitimized the need for developing countries to adopt policy 
measures designed to protect their own industries. Understood in the context of AGOA, 
the Haberler Report is also significant. The AGOA conditionality requirements contradict 
the essence of the Haberler Report, namely, that developing countries’ challenges in the 
context of international trade, culminate in developing countries not being able to foster 
                                                          
45Ibid (fn 42). 
46Allesandrini. D., ‘Developing Countries and the Multilateral Trade Regime, the Failures and Promises of the 
WTOs Developmental Mission’. Oxford: Hart Pub. Page 58. 2010. 
47The United Conference on Trade and Employment, ‘Preparatory Committee of the United Nations on Trade 




economic development. Furthermore, when the AGOA conditionality requirements are 
read in the context of the Haberler Report, it becomes clear that they have been applied 
arbitrarily, especially when one considers the recent USA and SA poultry dispute. 
Ozden48 writes on the negative effects of GSP and in Ozden’s view, preferences and their 
beneficial effects are limited by the protectionist practices of developed countries and in 
any event, once a developing country begins to rapidly improve its export capabilities, the 
preferences may be revoked by the donor country. On the issue of the revocation of 
preferences by donor countries, Ozden points out that the challenge with GSP preferences 
is that they fall outside the ambit of the GATT legal system, and as such, can be unilaterally 
changed and cancelled by donor countries at any time. 
The AGOA conditionality requirements, appear to be a prime example of the 
protectionism referred to by Ozden. The AGOA conditionality requirements are self-
defeating from the perspective of a developing country, because, in order for a developing 
country to be eligible for AGOA benefits, then that developing country must amongst 
other things, ‘eliminate all barriers to USA trade and investment, including national 
treatment of foreign investors and the protection of intellectual property rights’. It is not 
clear what is meant by ‘barriers to USA trade’, for example, does this include removing 
legally recognized protectionist measures such as the WTO anti-dumping measures? 
Ozden also writes on what he terms, the basics of GSP, where he explains that GSP 
preferences are granted to the developing world by the developed world, on a non-
reciprocal basis, which means that the beneficiary (developing country) is not required to 
reciprocate by inter alia granting liberalized market access. Read in this light, it appears 
clear that the AGOA conditionality requirements were drafted to serve the narrow 
interests of the USA, and were not drafted in a commercially clear and meaningful 
manner.49 
Ozden also attempts to argue that in the context of international trade law and integrating 
developing countries into the global trade system, reciprocity works better than non-
                                                          
48Ozden C. and Reinhardt E., ‘The Perversity of Preferences: The Generalized System of Preferences and 
Developing Country Trade Policies’, 1976-2000. The World Bank Development Research Group, Working Paper. 
Page 2. 2003. 
49Jones. V.C. ‘Trade Preferences: Economic Issues and Policy Options’. Congressional Research Services, 7-5700 
series. Page 21. 2013. 
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reciprocity found in GSP type preference programmes.50 Ozden also argues that countries 
involved in GSP preference programmes are less likely to liberalize than those that are not 
involved in the GSP programme.51 
This thesis argues that Ozden relies on technical information which is primarily comprised 
of formulae and algebra. While this thorough method is commendable, it detracts from 
what the real issues are in the context of international trade law and the integration of 
developing countries into the global trade system. Perhaps Gregory Bowman52 stated 
what has been argued more succinctly, when he stated the following: 
‘International Trade regulation is a highly technical and hyper-specialised area of the 
law, and in my experience there can be a scholarly tendency in the discipline to focus 
on technical matters at the expense of larger themes…’ 
What Bowman means is that, as commendable as illustrating the technical matters may 
be, the bigger picture might not get the focus and attention that it undoubtedly requires. 
For example, Ozden tends to not appreciate that it is an accepted principle that 
developing countries have, in the context of international trade, experienced vast 
economic, developmental difficulties.53 Ozden also tends to not appreciate that the 
Enabling Clause54 in GATT allowed for developed countries to give preferential treatment 
to developing countries owing to the challenges outlined above. 
The crux of Ozden’s arguments is that developing countries need to liberalize by 
reciprocating in accordance with WTO or GATT dispensation, instead of relying too heavily 
on GSP preferences. The reasoning given above can be used to argue against the author’s 
position. Furthermore, the OECD clarified that developing countries are reliant on trade 
taxes as a source of revenue.55 Therefore, to argue that developing countries should be 
                                                          
50Ozden C. and Reinhardt E., ‘The Perversity of Preferences: The Generalized System of Preferences and 
Developing Country Trade Policies’, 1976-2000. The World Bank Development Research Group, Working Paper. 
Page 19-20. 2003. 
51Ibid (fn 50). 
52Bowman G. W., ‘Of haves and have-nots: A review of Donatella Allesandrini; Developing Countries and the 
failure of the Multilateral Trade Regime: the failure and promise of the WTO’s development mission’. Trade 
Law and Development, Volume 3(1), page 235-236. 2011.  
53‘Decision Regarding Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of 
Developing Countries, December 4, 1979’. GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp). Page 191-193. 1980. 
54Ibid (fn 53). 
55Kowalski P., Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, ‘Impact of Changes in Tariffs on 
Developing Countries’ Government Revenue 9’. OECD Trade Policy, Working Paper No. 18. 2005. 
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reciprocating undermines developing countries’ needs to derive revenue from its trade 
taxes, it also undermines the principle of non-reciprocity endorsed by GATT and the 
Enabling Clause. 
The author’s views demonstrate that although developing countries’ needs have been 
documented and accepted, in practice the needs of developing countries are not upheld 
and protected. The AGOA conditionality requirements bare further testament to the view 
raised in this paragraph, in that they demand reciprocity by amongst other things, 
demanding that developing countries eliminate all barriers to USA trade.  
McCormick56 writes on the difficulties of pursuing African development through trade 
relationships with developed countries, suggesting that, in the context of developing 
countries, trading with developed countries with the objective of achieving African 
development is not a perfect solution. In the context of the developmental goals of 
developing countries, McCormick points out that the international trade community is 
aligned in its thinking that there is a need to help developing countries penetrate 
developed country markets while at the same time, affording developing countries the 
opportunity to preserve taxes and tariffs on imports, which is a vital source of revenue.57 
McCormick’s views are supported by a working paper of the OECD which stated the 
following: 
‘For many African states, trade taxes are the largest source of tax revenue. In African 
least developed countries, for example, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development has noted that import duties accounted for 34 percent of total 
government revenue over the three-year period of 1999-2001 and exceeded 50 percent 
of total government revenue in a number of states.’58 
Read in the light of McCormick’s views and the work of the OECD, the AGOA conditionality 
requirements appear to be malicious and could be seen as undermining developing 
countries’ rights to protect their infant markets. AGOA is non-reciprocal, meaning that the 
                                                          
56McCormick R., ‘The African Growth Opportunity Act: The perils of pursuing African development through U.S 
Trade Law. The Texas International Law Journal, Volume 41:339. 2006. 
57McCormick R., ‘The African Growth Opportunity Act: The perils of pursuing African development through U.S 
Trade Law. The Texas International Law Journal, Volume 41:339. Page 363-364. 2006. 
58Kowalski P., Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, ‘Impact of Changes in Tariffs on 
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beneficiaries to AGOA were never meant to reciprocate the benefits that were given to 
them under AGOA. During an interview conducted by the International Centre for Trade 
and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) Dr Witney Schneidman59 revealed that in his view, 
the USA would have to rethink its strategy as it relates to trade with Africa. This was 
according to Dr Schneidman, due to the fact that the EU had concluded EPAs with African 
regional communities, in all probability threatening the USA’s market share of the African 
continent.60  
Bhagwati61 argues that the aggressive push by developed countries, for reciprocity from 
developing countries is an issue that ought to be treated with due care and caution. If not, 
Bhagwati argues, the push for reciprocity will clash with the ideal of a free trading system 
and in doing so, make fair trade and enemy unto itself, instead of an ally unto itself.62 
Bhagwati’s argument is crucial as a foundation for some of the arguments that will be 
made throughout this thesis particularly in chapters 2 and 3.  
 
1.8 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This study will be an outright desk-top literature study. The researcher will rely on primary 
and secondary sources of data. This study will involve perusal of at least the following, 
and any developments thereof: 
 AGOA; 
 General System of Preferences; 
 Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization; 
 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1947 and the interpretive text thereof;  
 International Trade case law; 
 Other relevant case studies relating to the US and SA in their capacity as 
international trading nations. 
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The researcher also intends to make use of reliable internet sources covering the poultry 
dispute relating to the USA and SA. This study will to a large extent refer to journal articles 
relating to the bullet points above and such journal articles will either be accessed from 
internet sources or from the library of the University of Kwa-Zulu-Natal. 
 
1.9 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Preference programs and the advancement of Least Developed Countries  
In theory, all trade preference programs, such as AGOA have as their main aim, the 
development of least developed countries through improving their export capacity.63 To 
elaborate on this point, Raul Prebisch64, UNCTAD’s first Secretary General held the view 
that a system of generalized, non-reciprocal trade preferences needed to be established 
in order to benefit developing countries.65 Prebisch argued that allowing developing 
countries preferential access to developed country markets would result in developing 
countries benefitting from export led growth.66 According to UNCTAD, the proposed 
preference system would address the disparity between developing and developed 
countries by promoting industrialisation, increasing their export earnings, and 
                                                          
63Jones V. C. et al, ‘Trade Preferences: Economic Issues and Policy Options.’ Congressional Research Service, 7-
5700. Page 8-9. 2013. See also, The Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Trends 
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provision of increased access for their products in world markets, were among the primary objectives of 
the CONTRACTING PARTIES. These objectives were now set forth in a new Article XXXVI. Article XXXVII 
laid down the commitments in the field of commercial policy which contracting parties would accept in 
order to promote these objectives. Article XXXVIII provided for joint action by the contracting parties, 
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further the objectives’.  
The development of the trade capacity of developing countries was thus formalized and Contracting Parties 
were obliged to participate in the development of developing countries. 
64 Moss K., ‘The Consequences of the WTO Appellate Body Decision in EC – Tariff Preferences for the African 
Growth Opportunity Act and Sub-Saharan Africa’. New York University Journal of International Law and 
Politics. Page 669. 2006. 
65Ibid (fn 66). 
66Ibid (fn 64). 
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accelerating developing countries’ rates of economic growth.67 
 
The non-reciprocal nature of AGOA 
AGOA is non-reciprocal, meaning that the beneficiaries to AGOA were never meant to 
reciprocate the benefits that were given to them under AGOA.  
Conditions contained in Preference Programs  
In practice, conditionality or eligibility requirements may form part of a preference program, 
stated differently. AGOA for example, contains several conditions and the one that I will be 
focusing on requires, in respect of SSA nations, ‘the elimination of barriers to United States 
trade and investment, including national treatment of foreign investors and the protection of 
intellectual property rights’. 
What is less clear and less accepted is whether conditionality requirements serve a 
transparent and legitimate purpose. To expound on this statement, this thesis relies on the 
works of, Keven C. Kennedy68 who states the following in this regard: 
‘Some commentators have singled out U.S GSP conditionality for special condemnation on the 
ground that as a policy instrument, it exceeds the bounds of rational policy making by 
including conditions that have no relationship to promoting human rights (for example, 
Intellectual Property Rights protection and U.S investor protection)’. 
 
Summary of the conceptual framework 
The conceptual framework reveals a number of important issues and founding principles 
and they are as follows: 
 Preference programs were designed to assist developing countries in reaching their 
developmental needs by promoting industrialisation, increasing their export earnings 
and accelerating developing countries’ rates of economic growth.69  
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 AGOA was intended to be a non-reciprocal preference program, preference programs 
are ‘generous’70 by their nature, requiring generosity of the donor nation to the 
beneficiary nation. Generosity does not in principle entail an element of reciprocity, 
or taking back, this is contrary to the manner in which AGOA has been enforced by the 
US in relation to South Africa and the poultry dispute. 
 The existence of conditions in AGOA or any other preference programs does not raise 
questions of legality or immorality. However, the existence of some conditions in 
AGOA, coupled with the manner in which the USA has applied these, raises questions 
about the USA’s true intentions and their good faith (or a lack thereof). Raj Bhala 
states the following in respect of the AGOA conditions: 
‘It is not difficult to mount a case that the AGOA eligibility requirements are 
self-interested, indeed, nakedly so’.71 
The above quotation is an illustration of some of the criticism that is levelled at AGOA 
conditions and the manner in which these conditions are enforced. 
 
1.10 ANTICIPATED LIMITATIONS 
There is scarce literature dealing specifically with the AGOA conditionality requirements. 
The overwhelming majority of the literature merely mentions the AGOA conditionality 
requirements, without going into great depth on what these conditions means and most 
importantly, how they have been applied. Raj Bhala is one of the leading authors critiquing 
AGOA conditions, in relation to the AGOA condition requiring that SA remove all barriers 
to USA trade, Raj Bhala states the following –  
‘the third requirement is designed to help the United States gain access in SSA.’72 
This thesis argues that what Raj Bhala means is that, the condition requiring that SSA 
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nations remove all barriers to USA trade73 serves no legitimate objective other than to 
further the narrow interests of the USA.  
Kevin C. Kennedy also argues against the conditionality requirements contained in AGOA, 
and states the following in that regard –  
‘In short, conditionality is a stage for bad political theater, and its impact on the 
beneficiary level is arguably negligible. The elimination of conditionality in all donor-
country GSP programs should be given serious consideration’.74 
This thesis argues that, unfortunately the author’s statement is difficult to understand, 
especially where he states that conditionality’s impact on beneficiary nations is negligible. 
This is at odds with the remainder of the statement which suggests that conditionality 
lends itself to political abuse, and this is one of the reasons that this thesis argues 
conditionality requirements in AGOA ought to be reconsidered, so that they can have a 
more meaningful role to play than just to serve the interests of the USA. 
 
1.11 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
 Chapter 1 – ‘Introduction (Research Proposal)’; 
 Chapter 2 – ‘The history of GATT and the WTO and the uneven positions of the 
developed countries and the developing countries in international trade’; 
 Chapter 3 – ‘The history of the trade relationship between SA and USA and USA and 
SSA countries and a legal analysis of AGOA, as it relates to the poultry industry’; 
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CHAPTER TWO – THE HISTORY OF GATT AND THE WTO AND THE UNEVEN 




This chapter seeks to review the policy position of developing countries in the context of 
international trade law. This chapter will also review some of the challenges faced by 
developing countries and whether these have been given recognition in any international 
trade law instruments. Lastly, this chapter will analyse how the international community has 
responded to the needs of developing countries. 
 
This chapter aims to determine the extent to which the multilateral trading system developed 
to co-ordinate the relationship between developed and developing countries, from a policy 
perspective. Thus, this chapter will briefly summarize the various policy positions gained by 
developing countries in terms of various policy documents and milestone events in the 
context of international trade law. The policy positions gained by developing countries are 
essential to understanding firstly, the starting negotiating positions of developing countries 
in international trade law, and secondly, to what extent if any, the negotiating positions of 
developing countries have improved over time. The negotiating positions of developing 
countries are in turn crucial because they could potentially add to the discussion on whether 
the condition in the AGOA requiring that Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries eliminate 
barriers to United States of America (USA) trade,75 has lent itself to abuse at the instance of 
the USA.   
 
J Scott76 who explains the importance of understanding the developing countries negotiating 
positions slightly differently, is of the view that in order to understand a country’s views it is 
necessary to understand the ideas that inform these views and that a countries’ past 
experiences contribute a great deal to its present day views and stances that manifest during 
trade negotiations. Scott’s views are crucial for purposes of this chapter because ultimately 
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the chapter intends to argue that the USA has always been prejudiced by its own policy 
interests in the field of international trade law. Accepting Scott’s arguments and other 
authors on the importance of understanding the ideas that inform a country’s views, it is 
important to understand why the USA has displayed a consistently prejudicial stance towards 
developing countries, especially like South Africa. 
 
2.2 THE ITO NEGOTIATIONS 
This chapter outlines that, although the ITO negotiations did not materialise into hard rules, 
the ITO negotiations were nevertheless significant from the perspective of developing 
countries.77 At the time of the ITO negotiations, much of the world power was held by the 
USA.78 This is evidenced by the fact that the USA controlled three-quarters of the world’s 
monetary gold and was responsible for one-third of the world’s exports.79 The UK and its large 
empire were also significant even if this significance did not quite match-up with that of the 
USA.80 The power and significance of the USA and the UK is relevant to this thesis, and more 
specifically, this chapter as much of the negotiations (especially with the ITO) took the mould 
of the views of the developed countries such as the USA and the UK.  
From the ITO negotiations, the developing countries had sought protection of infant 
industries, with measures that were not recognized, and hence not available, receiving new 
tariff preferences from other developed or developing countries and, the right to benefit from 
developed country tariff concessions without having to offer equivalent tariff concessions of 
their own.81 Notwithstanding opposition by the USA, some of the protections sought by the 
developing countries were incorporated in GATT. These included, the ITO Charter’s infant-
industry exception for tariffs and the quantitative import restrictions.82 The ITO negotiations 
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presented developing countries an opportunity to argue what their needs were.83 In the 
words of Capling,84 
‘Most of the countries at Havana had not been a party to the earlier negotiations and 
the hard-fought compromises. Now it was their turn to denounce the Charter85, to seek 
exemptions from its provisions, and to demand exceptions based on their own 
particular problems’. 
From a policy perspective and from a negotiation perspective, this chapter argues that all that 
was required by developing countries at the time required was an acknowledgment from the 
developed countries that developing countries did have unique challenges that required a 
measure of special treatment.  
Having established the position of developing countries at the level of the ITO negotiations, 
this chapter will now argue that the negotiating positions that the developing countries 
secured in the various negotiating rounds,86 such as the ITO discussions, the Tokyo Rounds 
and the Uruguay Rounds were strong and ensured to a large extent, that such countries would 
be able to protect their interests for years to come.  
 
2.3 DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THEIR INTERACTIONS WITH THE GATT TRADING SYSTEM 
This chapter focuses on the GATT round of negotiations and the three primary challenges that 
these presented for developing countries. These challenges were the principle of reciprocity, 
the primary supplier rule, and the limitation to tariffs only in negotiations.87 
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At the ITO negotiations the USA were adamant that the principle of reciprocity should form 
the founding principle of GATT.88 Developing countries such as India objected to the USA 
demand for reciprocity by pointing out that developing countries’ markets were much smaller 
in size and as such, did not have the bargaining power required to make the tariff concessions 
required by the USA.89 Furthermore, developing countries required the ability to be able to 
protect their infant industries due to their early stage in the process of industrialization.90 
Moreover, in 1947, many tariffs of developing countries were lower on average than those of 
developed countries. From this perspective, it therefore, seemed strange that developing 
countries would be required to make further concessions.91 Furthermore, exports of 
developing countries were primarily to be found in raw materials which in any event were 
accepted in duty-free markets; concessions from this perspective also appeared not to be 
rational.92 In direct contrast, for those goods where developing countries were likely most 
competitive, such as agricultural goods, developed countries were implementing non-tariff 
barriers, such as high internal taxes and subsidies to remain competitive.93 This position 
hampered developing countries whom could not effectively compete against such non-tariff 
barriers. From the perspective of developing countries, again, it ceased to make any sense 
why developing countries were expected to make tariff concessions when the developed 
world, the USA a case in point, seemed at liberty to implement what measures they deemed 
appropriate. 
To be clear, developing countries did accept the overall principle of tariff liberalisation, with 
a reservation coming from one un-named nation.94 At the heart of the issue of accepting the 
principle of trade liberalization was the word ‘substantial’ and what actually constituted a 
‘substantial’ reduction in tariffs.95 Amongst the developing countries’ objections, India’s 
objection was particularly well phrased, contextualizing why the word ‘substantial’ caused 
controversy. India asked the following question in this regard: 
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‘Are we going to declare the country to be a defaulter because the performance made by it 
does not come up to the performance made by other countries which may be in an entirely 
different position, in an entirely different state of economic development, or because the 
performance is not what can be described as substantial?’96 
This chapter argues that the ‘substantial’ requirement was always going to be controversial 
because the term would mean something different for a particular developed country and 
something different for a particular developing country (mainly due to their different level of 
development). Moreover, the term ‘substantial’ only served to look after the interest of the 
developed countries because the interpretation of this term would have in most cases skewed 
towards the interpretation of developed countries. This argument can be supported by the 
proposal to have a so-called Tariff Committee to assist with interpretational issues.97 It is 
difficult to envision many cases where the interpretation of ‘substantial’ would have gone in 
the favour of developing countries. Indeed, it would be naïve to even suggest that a Tariff 
Committee with the design and thinking of developed countries would be in favour of 
developing countries more than for developed countries. It comes as no surprise that the 
proposed Tariff Committee was abandoned in favour of rather establishing an Executive 
Board which would have guaranteed seats for developing countries.98 
By the late 1940s, development in the GATT system was a universally accepted construction 
and the thinking underlying the construction of development under GATT was that it would 
lead to economic growth, provided that there was industrialization driven by trade 
liberalization.99 Developing countries grew discontent with the theoretical underpinnings of 
GATT as they learnt more of the structural imbalances of the international trading regime.100 
This thesis argues that the dissatisfaction of GATT among developing countries was twofold. 
Firstly, GATT supported the rhetoric that economic development by developing countries 
would best be attained by trade liberalization and secondly, GATT policy was contradictory 
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and confused in that it spoke against protectionism, yet at the same time, the USA exempted 
agriculture and fisheries from the prohibition of quantitative restrictions.101 
The trading position for developing countries under GATT was in fact quite worrisome for the 
following reasons. They struggled to export primary products such as agricultural products to 
the shores of developed countries, and was due to the discriminatory measures that 
developed countries imposed on these agricultural products.102 This situation was outrageous 
and contradictory, surely in scenarios where developing countries sought to export products 
where they had a comparative advantage, they ought to have been supported by the 
international trade community, specifically the GATT system? Furthermore, under GATT, the 
principle of reciprocity implied tariff reductions given by developed countries needed to be 
paid for by developing countries.103 The position of developing countries being undisputed, it 
was not realistic for the USA and the GATT trading system to expect that developing countries 
would be able to reciprocate, at such an aggressive rate. 
It is important to remember that at no point in trade negotiations did developing countries 
become submissive and accept the international trading system as is. Actually, deep into the 
GATT negotiations, the developing countries resisted the imbalances of the GATT regime and 
sought to reform its rules.104 Key to reforming the GATT rules in any way was always going to 
be challenging, and correcting the GATT’s skewed view on developing countries and their 
unique needs.105 Perhaps the most significant view of GATT, purely due to the implications 
that it held for developing countries, was that, in order for developing countries to reach the 
heights that were reached by industrialised countries, developing countries needed to 
liberalise their trade, as had been done by industrialised countries.106 The GATT view was 
fundamentally flawed for two reasons. Firstly, it operated under the assumption that 
developed countries owed their successes to completely liberalizing their trade. This 
assumption is largely incorrect as the USA, UK and France all implemented various policy 
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measures in order to protect their industries.107 Secondly, it failed to appreciate the 
difficulties that were in fact faced by developing countries, highlighted in the Haberler Report. 
Deep into the GATT negotiations, the developing countries resisted the imbalances of the 
GATT regime and sought to reform its rules.108 Key to reforming the GATT rules in any way 
was always going to be challenging as was correcting the GATT’s skewed view on developing 
countries and their unique needs.109 Perhaps the most significant view of GATT, purely due to 
the implications that it held for developing countries was that, in order for developing 
countries to reach the heights that were reached by industrialised countries, developing 
countries needed to liberalise their trade, as had been done by industrialised countries.110 
The GATT view was fundamentally flawed for two reasons. Firstly, it operated under the 
assumption that developed countries owed their successes to completely liberalizing their 
trade. This assumption is largely incorrect as the USA, UK and France all implemented various 
policy measures in order to protect their industries.111 Secondly, it failed to appreciate the 
difficulties that were in fact faced by developing countries, highlighted in the Haberler Report. 
The persistence of developing countries culminated in GATT eventually recognizing the 
special circumstances of developing countries. Acceptance culminated in GATT conceding 
that developing countries were allowed some leniency in so far as the enforceability of GATT 
provisions was concerned. Various amendments to GATT provisions were effected on the 
back of arguments made by developing countries.112 Unfortunately, notwithstanding the 
persistence of developing countries and the various amendments that were made to GATT, 
developed countries continued to discriminate against the trade of developing countries.113 
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2.4 HABERLER REPORT 
The work of the Haberler Report was crucial from the perspective of international trade, but 
more so from the perspective of developing countries. Although traces of acknowledgment 
of the developmental requirements of developing countries could be identified at ITO level 
and GATT level, no institution had formally committed to paper, precisely what the position 
of developing countries was, the challenges and precisely what needed to be done in an 
attempt to address these stated challenges. 
The Haberler Report was published in 1958 and was mandated with studying the contracting 
parties’ compliance with the GATT rules of conduct; 114 more importantly, it sought to study 
the reasons for developing countries so-called failure. This was important because up to the 
advent of the Haberler Report, the assumption was that developing countries were the 
masters of their own demise. Part of this assumption was that developing countries could not 
perform well in trade for as long as they failed to liberalise their trade and that to achieve the 
heights of the developed countries, developing countries needed to liberalise like the 
developed countries had done and continued to do.  
The Haberler Report was also significant because developing countries were caricatured by 
the developed world and many of its academics as being resistant to GATT discipline, and 
wanting nothing else but exceptions and special treatment from any negotiation rounds that 
they were privy to. Simply put, developing countries were caricatured as non-conformists.115 
The caricaturing of developing countries as non-conformists is deeply significant and 
worrisome for two reasons. Firstly, if developing countries were understood by developed 
countries as been non-conformists, then this undermined the position of developing 
countries in a sense that their legitimate needs would in most cases simply be ignored and 
dismissed. Secondly, any legitimate arguments made by developing countries would be 
clouded by their caricaturing as non-conformists. 
Contrary to the assumptions and caricaturing outlined above, the Haberler Report found that 
some of the challenges faced by developing countries were regional trading blocks, instability 
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of commodity prices and the discrimination that was being practiced by developed countries 
against developing countries (which came in the form of agricultural protectionism).116 
Although hardly expressed in these terms, the findings outlined in the Haberler Report were 
an indictment on the developed countries, since for some time, these countries had been 
aggressively pushing developing countries to liberalise their trade as developed countries had 
supposedly done. 
To address the issues that were outlined in the Haberler Report, the GATT contracting parties 
established an expansion programme and the expansion programme’s committee (referred 
to as Committee III) was tasked with looking into the discriminatory measures that were being 
used by developed countries. Committee III findings were quite startling and revealed that 
developed countries had actively participated in frustrating the trade of less-developed 
countries.117 The practice deployed by developed countries was to frustrate both traditional 
exports and exports of manufacture, by way of tariffs, quantitative restrictions, internal taxes, 
state trading and import monopolies.118 Furthermore, Committee III found that developing 
countries faced high-tariffs on their major exports, such as, vegetable oil, coffee, tea, cocoa 
products, jute products, cotton products, sporting goods and leather goods.119 
Thus, the Haberler Report revealed that the conduct of developed countries was not 
consistent with GATT principles, and in fact it flouted everything that GATT stood for. This was 
not the only problem, as there was a larger problem and theme, and this was that developed 
countries were failing to do the same things that they so proudly and aggressively pushed for, 
such as trade liberalization. Therefore, the Haberler Report’s most significant contributions 
were that it clearly defined what challenges were being faced by developing countries and 
the nature of these challenges. Also, the assumptions underlying the so-called failure of 
developing countries were now laid to rest, and the caricaturing of developing countries and 
non-conformists could now also be laid to rest. 
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2.5 THE GSP AND ITS INTERACTIONS WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
The General System of Preferences (GSP) is comprised of trade preferences that are granted 
by developed countries to donor countries.120 One of the key characteristics of GSP is that the 
donor country is not required to reciprocate on the benefits that it has been granted. GSP was 
first proposed at the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
in 1964.121 At the second session of UNCTAD in 1968, a resolution was unanimously adopted, 
in terms of which ‘a mutually acceptable system of generalized, non-reciprocal and non-
discriminatory trade preferences which would be beneficial to the developing countries’, 
would be implemented.122 In 1970, a Special Committee on preferences was established and 
in the same year adopted the Agreed Conclusions which outlined the details of the GSP 
arrangement.123 
GSP was seen by UNCTAD as a means of encouraging the participation of developing countries 
in GATT.124 Dr. Supachai Panitchpakdi, current Secretary-General of the U.N Conference on 
Trade and Development and former Director-General of the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
summarized the purpose of GSP as follows125 –  
‘The Generalized System of Preferences was established on the basis of the economic 
theory that preferential tariff rates in developed-country markets could promote 
export-driven industry growth in developing countries. It was believed that this, in turn, 
would help free beneficiaries from heavy dependence on trade in primary products, the 
slow long-term growth and price instability of which contributed to the chronic trade 
deficits. It was thought that only the larger markets of industrialized trading partners 
were big enough to provide the economic stimulus needed to attain these goals’. 
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According to Snyder,126 ‘GSP was seen as part of a larger development strategy that included 
measures such as import-substitution policies, infant industry protection and preferential 
access to developed countries’ markets’.127 This chapter argues that the intended purpose of 
the GSP as being a larger developmental strategy, is important for conceptualizing AGOA. 
The key enabling tool allowing developing countries to make full use of GSP is the provision 
of ‘better-than-Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment’ to imports from qualifying donor 
countries.128 An example of the better than MFN treatment is the GSP established by the USA, 
this GSP program set a zero tariff on 6,409 articles from beneficiary states (out of a total of 
15,467 tariff lines), while other countries were subject to normal tariffs, which were 
ultimately the higher MFN tariffs.129 
One of the most controversial GSP discussions in trade literature is that GSP clashes with two 
principles of the multilateral trading system.130 Firstly, GSP contradicts the principle of 
reciprocity because the donor country is not expected to reciprocate.131 Secondly, the GSP 
contradicts the principle of non-discrimination in trade.132 The two fundamental challenges 
presented by the GSP were rectified temporarily in 1971, with the advent of the special GSP 
waivers which were granted by GATT members.133 In 1979, the challenges brought about by 
the GSP were resolved by the, 'Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and 
Fuller Participation of Developing Countries decision’ also known as the ‘Enabling Clause’ of 
the Tokyo Round agreements.134 
Paragraph one of the Enabling Clause135 provides that contracting parties may accord special 
and differential treatment to developing countries 'notwithstanding' article 1 of GATT 1947. 
With reference to paragraph 2(a),136 the exemption outlined in the Enabling Clause is 
understood to apply to, 'preferential tariff treatment accorded by developed contracting 
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parties to products originating in developing countries in accordance with the General 
Preferences'. Footnote 3 to paragraph 2(a), which speaks of the 1971 Waiver Decision, 
describes the GSP as a system of, 'generalized, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory 
preferences beneficial to developing countries'.137 It is understood that it is this description of 
the GSP as 'non-discriminatory' that is at the heart of the contentions that 
formed part of the Appellate Body's decision in EC – Tariff Preferences. 
A brief summary of the EC – Tariff Preferences decision is as follows. The dispute concerned a 
case initiated by the Government of India, at the WTO against the European Union (EU). The 
Government of India alleged that the EC’s special tariff preference arrangement to combat 
drug production and trafficking (EC Tariff Preference Drug Arrangements) violated the Most 
Favoured Nation (MFN) principle of Article I:1 of GATT138. The Government of India further 
argued that the EC Tariff Preference Drug Arrangements was not permitted in terms of the 
Enabling Clause. In terms of the EC Tariff Preference Drug Arrangements, twelve GSP 
beneficiary countries were granted greater tariff reductions than what were offered to other 
developing countries in terms of the EC’s GSP.139 India argued that the EC Tariff Preference 
Drug Arrangements also violated the WTO obligations.140 The WTO agreed with India, and 
held that the Enabling Clause requires that, ‘identical tariff preferences under GSP schemes 
be provided to all developing countries without differentiation’.141 The effect of the EC – Tariff 
Preferences decision was therefore that the EC Tariff Preference Drug Arrangements ought 
to have applied to all developing countries, even those developing countries that were not 
deemed by developed countries as GSP beneficiaries.142  
As was to be expected given the magnitude of the EC – Tariff Preferences and what was 
actually at stake, the EC appealed the WTO’s decision and the WTO Appellate Body (Appellate 
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Body) reversed the Panel’s decision and held that the Enabling Clause does not require 
developed countries to offer GSP preferences to all developing countries.143 Instead, the 
Appellate Body found that the Enabling Clause permits developed countries to treat 
developing countries within its GSP system differently, provided that similarly situated GSP 
beneficiaries are offered equal treatment.144 The decision of the Appellate Body was 
considered a victory for the reason that it paved the way for continued use and reliance on 
GSP type programs by developing countries who were fortunate enough to be identified and 
selected on these programmes. 
This thesis argues that the EC – Tariff Preferences decision was significant for three primary 
reasons. Firstly, the GSP was a fundamental departure from the MFN principle. Secondly, the 
GSP was a fundamental departure from the principle of non-discrimination. Thirdly, the EC – 
Tariff Preferences decision potentially had serious ramifications for already existing GSP 
programs as well as any future GSP programmes. If the Appellate Body ruled against the GSP 
Preferences, then already existing GSP programmes could be successfully challengeable by 
opposing countries.145 If the Appellate Body ruled in favour of GSP, then existing and future 
GSP programmes would be difficult to challenge successfully, in future, on legal grounds, 
because a precedent would have been set by the Appellate Body.146This thesis argues that 
AGOA is a GSP type programme and thus it should allow for GSP type exceptions at the 
instance of developing countries, such as import-substitution policies, infant industry 
protection, and preferential access to developed countries’ markets.147 This thesis will argue 
in chapter 4 (Legal analysis of AGOA, as it relates to the poultry industry), that AGOA does not 
uphold the principles that form the foundation of GSP type programmes. 
 
As was alluded to earlier in this chapter, it is important to understand that the GSP was 
intended to bolster a larger developmental agenda.148 Furthermore, in terms of this 
developmental agenda, measures such as import-substitution policies, infant industry 
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protection, and preferential access to developed countries’ markets, were all envisioned.149 
When one considers AGOA and the recent poultry dispute between the USA and SA, the initial 
intent of GSP programs seem to have been undermined and even contradicted. For example, 
the AGOA condition requiring that SSAs eliminate all barriers to USA trade and investment, 
including national treatment of foreign investors and the protection of intellectual property 
rights,150 seems at odds with the stated developmental agenda of GSP programmes. 
Commenting on GSP eligibility criteria, Snyder151 points out that some eligibility criteria are 
ambiguous and he uses various examples such as, beneficiaries that, ‘engage in activities that 
undermine United States national security or foreign policy interests’152 or do not provide, 
‘adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights’,153 risk having their benefits 
suspended.154 This chapter argues that these conditions are vague and open to interpretation 
and that it is no co-incidence that these conditions are vague and open to interpretation, as 
it appears to have been a well-crafted strategy by the USA. Bearing in mind that, AGOA being 
part of the USA GSP programme, falls outside the WTO and the effect of this is that these 
conditions would be subject to the USA government instead of a WTO panel. Further 
arguments in respect of AGOA conditionally requirements will be made in chapter 4 (Legal 
analysis of AGOA, as it relates to the poultry industry) of this chapter. 
 
2.6 THE TOKYO ROUNDS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
From the perspectives of developing countries, the Tokyo Rounds of Negotiations 
(Tokyo Rounds) resembled something of a victory, due to the fact that as it had been the case 
since 1947, developing countries had managed to get something out of this negotiation 
round. The overarching purpose of the Tokyo Rounds of negotiations was to try and carve out 
an alternative to GATT strictures, this alternative would come in the form of framework 
agreements.155 
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From the perspective of developing countries, the framework agreements were hugely 
significant because they gave birth to the Enabling Clause, which was discussed earlier in this 
dissertation. The Enabling Clause paved the way for permanent legal authorization of the 
following156 –  
 GSP preferences; 
 Preferences in trade between developing countries; 
 ‘more favourable’ treatment for developing countries in other GATT rules 
dealing with non-tariff trade barriers; and 
 Special favourable treatment for the least-developed countries. 
The framework agreements also solidified the ‘infant-industry’ protections that developing 
countries had expended lots of energy arguing for and justifying to developed countries.157 
The ‘non-reciprocity’ principle that developing countries had also tried very hard to argue and 
justify to developed countries had also gained much needed traction and political clout under 
the Tokyo Rounds.158 Notwithstanding the significant concessions that developing countries 
had managed to carve-out under the Tokyo Rounds, the developed countries did manage to 
get developing countries to make a few concessions of their own by stating that159 –  
‘Less developed contracting parties expect that their capacity to make contributions or 
negotiated concessions or to take other mutually agreed action… would improve with 
the progressive development of their economies and improvement in their trade-
situation and they would accordingly expect to participate more fully in the framework 
of rights and obligations under the General Agreement’. 
What the above developing country concession meant was that, developing countries were 
agreeing that once the state of their economies and growth had reached a level where they 
could start participating in international trade, requiring less concessions from developed 
countries and less reliance on protection measures such as, infant industry protection and 
non-reciprocity, then developing countries would in effect ‘graduate’ from their developing 
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country status and in doing so, relinquish all the protections that they had managed to seal 
under various negotiating rounds. This thesis argues that the developing country concession 
was problematic for two primary reasons. Firstly, who would be tasked with deciding that a 
developing country had indeed ‘graduated’? Secondly, how would this actor know with 
certainty that a particular developing country was indeed ready for ‘graduation?’. 
From the perspective of developed countries, the Tokyo Rounds had little desired effect. As 
was alluded to earlier in this chapter, the Tokyo Rounds were supposed to grant developed 
countries a new type of option to contain developing countries, seen as GATT discipline 
tended to favour developing countries.160 This outcome was not achieved and in fact, 
developing countries came out of the negotiations with further concessions and 
acknowledgements. From the perspective of developing countries, little had changed, in a 
sense developing countries continued to win concessions, exceptions and 
acknowledgements, as they had done since the days of the ITO Negotiations. 
 
2.7 URUGUAY ROUNDS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
The Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations (Uruguay Round) began in Punta del 
Este, Uruguay, in 1986 and concluded in 1994.161 The Uruguay Round represented a 
significant departure from previous negotiating rounds in that it was seen as a ‘one size fits 
all’ type of arrangement162, devoid of all the exceptions and special treatment prominently 
featured in previous negotiating rounds. From the perspective of developed countries, the 
Uruguay Round represented the type of legal discipline that the developed countries had 
sought to attain under previous negotiation rounds.163 
The shortcomings of dispute settlement under GATT 1947 and under the Tokyo Round Codes 
prompted developing countries and developed countries to discuss improvements to the 
GATT 1947 dispute settlement regime.164  Subsequently, negotiations on dispute settlement 
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were given priority and included in the agenda of the Uruguay Rounds.165 One of the 
outcomes of the Uruguay Rounds manifested itself in the year of 1989, when the contracting 
parties adopted the, Decision of 12 April 1989, on Improvements to the GATT 1947 Dispute 
Settlement Rules and Procedures (Decision).  The Decision contained inter alia, the right to a 
panel and strict time-frames for panel proceedings.166 
Furthermore, the Uruguay Round resulted in strengthened dispute settlement mechanisms, 
detailed procedures in respect of the various stages of a dispute, and stringent time frames 
that sought to ensure, inter alia, prompt settlement of disputes.167  The newly strengthened 
dispute mechanisms also applied to all of the covered agreements.168 
One of the most prominent features of the strengthened dispute settlement mechanisms was 
the contracting party’s inability to block the establishment of a panel, through the exercise of 
a veto right.169 Under the improved dispute settlement mechanisms, the Dispute Settlement 
Board (DSB) automatically established a panel and adopted panel and Appellate Body reports, 
unless there was an agreement not to do so. 
From the perspective of developing countries, the strengthened dispute settlement 
mechanism actually meant that developed countries had new arms in their midst, these new 
arms could be used whenever developing countries sought not to comply with the now, WTO 
dispensation.170  Perhaps one of the most impactful additions made by the Uruguay Rounds 
was the jettisoning of special and differential treatment and replacing it with ‘technical 
assistance’ mechanism.171 This modification was significant because, special and differential 
treatment was definitive in nature, understood by developing countries and developed 
countries. In contrast, the notion of technical assistance was vague and ambiguous and not 
well understood by developing countries.172 
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The significance and importance of chapter 2 is that it outlines the journey that developed 
and developing countries have endured through the history of international trade and various 
trade negotiations. This chapter argues that it is important to understand the negotiating 
positions of both developed and developing countries in order to understand why the USA 
and SA have conducted themselves the way that they have during the AGOA renegotiations 
and poultry disputes. This type of appreciation should also be useful in formulating proposals 
as to how the USA and SA should conduct themselves in future AGOA negotiations and other 
trade discussions. Put slightly differently, the journeys of the developed countries and 
developing countries have shaped their attitudes in trade, and in the absence of an 
appreciation of this journey, it is difficult to understand these attitudes and why they are what 
they are. Scott173 states that –  
‘the legacy of colonialism and the resulting scepticism felt by developing countries 
towards the trade plans of the colonial states is largely ignored. Yet understanding the 
lasting impact of this experience on the attitudes of developing countries is critical to 
understanding their interaction with GATT…’ 
According to Scott, the attitudes of developing countries during the negotiation rounds has 
been as a result of their experiences throughout their colonial past, where developing 
countries had little say in the happenings of policy and economics.  
As has already been alluded to, developing countries at least had something to take away, 
from each of the negotiation rounds. However, at the advent of the Uruguay Rounds and the 
WTO, developing countries arguably took away less and less, as special and differential 
treatment, non-reciprocity, and the introduction of the vague technical assistance 
mechanism, had meant that developing countries had in effect lost the protections that they 
once had and that they were once able to place heavy reliance on. 
                                                          





Chapter 3 will discuss the trade relationship between the USA and SA and the USA and SSA 

























CHAPTER THREE – THE UNITED STATES TRADE RELATIONSHIP WITH SOUTH AFRICA 




This chapter will analyse how the trade relationship between SA and USA has developed over 
the years. An analysis of how AGOA and the implementation thereof has developed, since it’s’ 
inception, will also take place. This chapter will also review the condition in AGOA requiring 
that SSA countries remove barriers to US trade, and whether this condition has lent itself to 
abuse at the instance of the USA. An analysis will be done on how the relationship between 
SA and the USA has developed, specifically in respect of the SA poultry industry and in the 
light of the recent disputes thereof. Lastly, this chapter will look at possible legal and policy 
considerations that must be re-considered and implemented with the aim of ensuring that 
SSA countries, specifically SA, are able to fully utilize AGOA. 
This chapter argues that it is vital to formulate an understanding of the policy history as it 
relates to the USA and SA and the USA and SSA, because at the heart of AGOA and the 
decisions to draft this agreement were various policy discussions and subsequent policy 
decisions. In the absence of this understanding, this chapter argues that understanding USA 
and SA trade relations and USA and SSA trade relations, as they relate to AGOA, becomes 
increasingly difficult and the danger of being misled by well documented assumptions and 
misunderstanding important issues, lurks.174 
 
3.2 POLICY HISTORY OF THE USA AND SA  
USA policy towards SSA nations is predicated on the prospect of there being an economic 
benefit for the USA, derived from increased commerce between the USA and SA.175 According 
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to Langton,176 the interest displayed by the USA in increasing bilateral commerce between 
itself and SA, began after the end of the apartheid era in South Africa, in the early 1990s.177 
Furthermore, according to Langton,178 in 1993, Congress formalized its approval of the end to 
anti-apartheid restrictions and this approval was preceded by Commerce Secretary Ron 
Brown leading a business delegation to SA. According to Mills and Stremlau,179 delegations 
sent from the USA to SA were comprised of Republicans and Democrats, demonstrating that 
relations with SA were backed with political clout and were of the utmost importance. In a 
speech to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs, the then Minister Nzo,180 
stated the following –  
‘South Africa has features both of the developed and developing worlds. It is truly at 
the point of intersection between both worlds – an industrialised state of the South 
which can communicate with the North on equal terms to articulate the needs, the 
concerns and the fears of the developing world. Conversely we can interpret the 
concerns and the fears of the developed world’. 
The Minister’s statement showed that South Africa at the time sought to reciprocate the faith 
and interest that the USA displayed towards it. Although the statement can be criticized for 
self-claiming a fairly big role and importance for South Africa, the statement is important for 
understanding how South Africa understood its role on the African continent vis-à-vis the 
developed world. According to Schneidman,181 it was Bill Clinton who was responsible for 
introducing a fundamental change to US policy as it related to SSA nations, when he signed 
AGOA into law on May 18, 2000.  
According to Schneidman,182 before the USA’s shift in policy towards SSA nations, USA 
relations with Africa were in the main, defined by Cold War calculations, donor-recipient 
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relations, aid for poverty alleviation and emergency relief. Schneidman183 also points out that 
at the advent of AGOA, little thought was expended on USA exports to the African continent 
and the manner in which the USA would actually interact with the African market. This 
chapter argues that the point made by Schneidman is of huge significance for the following 
reasons. Schneidman’s point reveals that at the advent of AGOA the USA did not consider 
exports to the African continent as being hugely important, also reciprocity was not given 
much attention.  
In addition to the earlier arguments, Schneidman’s point also reveals a shift in policy, which 
is evidenced by the fact that during recent discussions between the USA and SA, in relation 
to the SA poultry industry, the USA was angered and frustrated by SA’s perceived refusal to 
reciprocate on AGOA, by granting the USA duty free access to the SA poultry market.184 As 
has already been alluded to, reciprocity at the instance of SSA nations was never an express 
provision of AGOA, thus three years after making the above points, Schneidman revealed 
another different angle on USA thinking and policy during a one-on-one interview conducted 
by the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), 185 where the 
ICTSD put the following to Schneidman –  
‘The EU concluded their Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with three African 
regional communities last year. Such a move has obliged the U.S to rethink its 
competitive positioning in Africa since AGOA, unlike the EPAs, is non-reciprocal in 
nature’.    
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Dr Schneidman’s response to what was put to him by the ICTSD was as follows –  
‘Well I think this goes to the heart of the U.S-Africa trade relationship because when 
we initiated AGOA, it was designed to accelerate economic development on the 
continent. We originally did not ask African countries to reciprocate. Now the EU has 
come forward with their EPAs. On the one hand, many African governments have 
resisted the EPAs and on the other hand, the EU threatened them with the loss of their 
preferential access… In all cases this situation has created a very difficult environment 
for the US to remain competitive within the African market! I think that we have to 
start a new conversation about our trade relationship in Africa. This is an issue that is 
going to have to be dealt with after the renewal of AGOA’.  
What Schneidman’s response reveals is that the USA realized that its African market share 
was under threat by the European Partnership Agreements (EPAs) concluded between EU and 
African countries.186 The USA had to respond to this imminent threat, and it was most 
convenient to respond by seeking reciprocity under AGOA.187 This chapter argues that this 
was a tactically astute response for a number of reasons. Firstly, requesting reciprocity under 
AGOA seemed fair given the substantial gains that AGOA has introduced to SSA nations, 
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specifically SA, over the years.188 Secondly, AGOA already contained somewhat vague and 
ambiguous conditionality requirements that the USA could utilize to threaten SA.189 Thirdly, 
economically and commercially, SA could ill afford to lose out on AGOA eligibility and on this 
basis, would do its level best to remain on the programme. 
Schneidman’s narrations on the nature of USA policy towards Africa are supported by 
McCormick190 who states that the troubles of East West relations and the fall of the Berlin 
Wall in 1989 were the cause of sudden democratic attention being given to SSA nations. This 
democratic attention also resulted in the USA redirecting its policy away from geopolitics and 
towards support for democracy and free elections.191 McCormick argues that the USA’s 
sudden attention on Africa and its demands on African governments to improve governance 
and create a new environment characterized by liberalised politics, was calculated at 
persuading African governments on, ‘repudiating authoritarian structures and aggressively 
adopting Western principles of liberal democratic government’.192 According to McCormick, 
the ideals canvassed in the quote immediately above can be traced in the AGOA texts, 
specifically the conditionality requirements of the AGOA text.193 
Faber and Orbie194 argue that the approach followed by the USA was to pursue ‘soft 
reciprocity’, through for example, AGOA, while the EU aggressively went in pursuit of 
reciprocity through the use of FTAs. Faber and Orbie further argue that this policy decision 
was driven by the USA’s fear of FTAs being fully optimized by developing countries, to the 
extent where the USA would have been required to reciprocate, possibly exposing its import 
sensitive markets such as agriculture and textiles. That reciprocity was not given much 
attention by the USA is further supported by the fact that AGOA is hardly clear on the principle 
of reciprocity, perhaps the most clarity that AGOA provides in respect of reciprocity is the 
following paragraph that appears from the text of AGOA –  
‘encouraging the reciprocal reduction of trade and investment barriers in Africa will 
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enhance the benefits of trade and investment for the region as well as enhance 
commercial and political ties between the United States and sub-Saharan Africa’.195 
This thesis argues that the above paragraph is vague and ambiguous and that it is open to 
almost any interpretation that a reader would deem fit.196 On the basis of the works quoted 
above, USA policy towards Africa and SSA was founded on a number of considerations and 
these considerations are, the Cold War and geo-politics, the fall of the apartheid era in SA, 
economic considerations, opportunism, pressure within the political rank of the USA and 
perceived burgeoning economic opportunities in Africa for the USA, presumably caused by 
the EUs more aggressive investment strategy. Agreements such as AGOA and FTAs have also 
played a significant role in developing USA policy towards SSA nations. This is because these 
agreements have provided a platform for the USA to articulate its policy stances. AGOA is 
unilateral in nature and as such is supposed to embody unilateral trade principles only, but as 
will be discussed later in this chapter, AGOA contains FTA type provisions. 
 
3.3 THE FORMALIZATION OF USA POLICY TOWARDS SSA AND SA 
In the year 2000, Congress passed AGOA, a USA trade preference program.197According to Williams,198 
AGOA is a USA trade preference program which is intended to bolster market-led economic growth 
and development in SSA and strengthen US trade and investment ties with SSA. According to the 
United States Trade Representative (USTR), ‘AGOA has been the cornerstone of America’s economic 
engagement with sub-Saharan Africa over the past fourteen years’.199 
From SA’s perspective and other SSA nations, AGOA is important because it has reduced USA barriers 
to trade and thereby, granting easier access to USA export markets.200 To recap, as far back as the 
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Haberler Report of 1958, it was already documented that developing countries’ needed to improve 
on their export earnings in order to facilitate growth and development. Furthermore, Committee III, 
a culmination of the Haberler Report, lamented the discriminatory practices implemented by 
developed countries, such as import restrictions, trading and import monopolies as well as the 
frustration of traditional exports such as agriculture. To an extent, AGOA has succeeded in most of the 
challenges that Committee III identified that required resolution. 
To be precise, AGOA authorizes, with the exception of textiles and apparel, the granting by the 
president of the USA duty-free treatment for articles that are the ‘growth, product, or manufacture’ 
of a beneficiary if, after receiving the advice of the International Trade Commission, the president 
determines that the article is not import sensitive.201  
This thesis argues that in order to fully appreciate AGOA, AGOAs path before it became legislation is 
important to understand because this path was largely responsible for shaping AGOA. To be clear, 
there were competing USA domestic interest groups when it came to the question of whether AGOA 
should be enacted as law.202 These competing interests were the pro-Africa constituency, the 
protectionist constituency and the trade-oriented business community. 
The pro-Africa constituency  
The pro-Africa constituency adopted normative, political and economic arguments in favour of the 
promulgation of AGOA.203 According to McCormick204 the democratization wave of the early 1990s, 
the fall of apartheid, and the emergence of a new class of leaders that were in favour of reform, 
instilled 205 the belief that Africa was on the brink of a renaissance. The Letter addressed by President 
Clinton to Congressman Rangel also inspired the belief that Africa was newly reformed and was a 
continent filled with fresh opportunities for the taking. The letter to Congressman Rangel stated the 
following –  
‘Africa is a continent on the doorstep of a new era of democracy and prosperity, and many 
countries have adopted market-oriented economic and political reforms in the past seven 
years. A stronger, stable, prosperous Africa will be a better economic partner, a better partner 
for security and peace, and a better partner in the fight against drug trafficking, international 
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crime, terrorism, the spread of disease and environmental degradation. Africa is already an 
important trading partner for the United States…’ 
In addition, America has its own special reasons to contribute to Africa’s economic 
development. Over thirty million Americans have ancestral origins in Africa. We should work 
to help African nations achieve greater prosperity and stronger democracies, which will 
improve the lives of the African people. This bill helps us do that. 
This bill is supported by a bipartisan and diverse cross-section of Americans and concerned 
groups …. We face a historic opportunity to assist the renaissance in Africa’. 
The letter to Congressman Rangel is important for the insight that it gives into US policy towards Africa, 
at the time. The letter reveals that the USA saw Africa as a potential business destination, and this was 
owing to the increasingly stabilized political climate that was submitting itself to reform. The letter 
also reveals a normative stance that the USA was adopting, and this was that the USA was home to 
over thirty million citizens who had their ancestral roots in Africa.206 It is important to note that at this 
stage, there was no stated intention that the USA would approach a trade relationship with Africa with 
the intention of securing the utmost of advantages and benefits. 
The protectionist constituency 
The protectionist constituency did not view the prospects of trade with Africa in the same light that 
the pro-Africa constituency did. For the protectionist constituency, trade with Africa was fraught with 
risks that would adversely affect the interests of USA business. The primary argument of USA business 
was that low-cost African imports would directly compete with established industries such as 
American textiles and apparel resulting in job losses for American people.207 The comments of Senator 
John Breaux during a Senate Finance Committee hearing on AGOA provide insight on the views of the 
protectionist constituency, specifically regarding labour issues. Senator John Breaux stated the 
following –  
‘From a trade standpoint, the only thing we are giving is that they will be getting stronger, and 
in the future, maybe, will be able to buy more of our products. That is not quite enough when 
I have people who are losing jobs by the thousands… I want to be for it, but I am not going to 
be for it unless we address the thousands of people in this country, many of which are African 
Americans who are on the edge of poverty who have lost their jobs. And I am going to go back 
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and say, we are going to liberalize trade with sub-Saharan Africa? That is good, but I have to 
find something that I can say to Louisianans that I am going to help them as well’.208 
This thesis argues that the comments of Senator Breaux characterized the protectionist approach of 
the protectionist constituency. It is also not clear to what extent the Senator’s claims on job losses 
were supported with facts. For the protectionist constituency, there were barely any other 
considerations to their arguments other than the loss of US jobs and this makes it difficult to attach 
any weight to the arguments made by this constituency. Furthermore, this thesis argues that the 
protectionist constituency failed to appreciate that African trade could have a positive impact for both 
the USA and Africa at large. 
The trade orientated constituency 
For the trade oriented constituency, trade with Africa would come with a number of tangible benefits, 
such as tariff-free importation of African apparel which would result in lower costs for end retailers of 
clothing products.209 
This thesis argues that the trade oriented constituency unlike the protectionist constituency 
interrogated AGOA and were able to identify possible value-add for US trade value chains. For 
example, US retail executives were of the view that AGOA would potentially lead to USA firms sourcing 
their apparel imports from SSA countries instead of Asian countries, a presumably cheaper strategy.210 
Pro-Africa constituency, protectionist constituency and trade oriented constituency 
The various constituencies and their interests were important in shaping AGOA and evidence of this 
is the manner in which AGOA was finally crafted. AGOA is comprised of a combination of pro-
Africanism, USA protectionism and trade oriented or free market type thinking, the various sections 
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3.4 ANALYSIS OF AGOA AND THE REQUIREMENT OF RECIPROCITY 
This chapter argues that reciprocity was never required under AGOA, but rather, reciprocity211 
was contemplated, in soft terms.212 There are a number of provisions in AGOA that support 
this argument. Section 103 (Statement of Policy), section 104 (Eligibility Criteria), section 116 
(Free Trade Agreements with Sub-Saharan African Countries)213 along with various 
paragraphs under section 116 support this argument. Section 103 (Statement of Policy) states 
the following –  
The AGOA statement of policy is comprised of the following points214 –  
‘Congress supports: 
(1) encouraging increased trade and investment between the United States and 
sub-Saharan Africa; 
(2) reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers and other obstacles to sub-Saharan 
African and United States trade; 
(3) expanding United States assistance to sub-Saharan Africa’s regional 
integration efforts; 
(4) negotiating reciprocal and mutually beneficial trade agreements, including the 
possibility of establishing free trade areas that serve the interests of both the 
United States and the countries of sub-Saharan Africa; 
(5) focusing on countries committed to the rule of law, economic reform, and the 
eradication of poverty; 
(6) strengthening and expanding the private sector in sub-Saharan Africa, 
especially enterprises owned by women and small businesses; 
(7) facilitating the development of civil societies and political freedom in sub-
Saharan Africa; 
(8) establishing a United States-Sub-Saharan Africa Trade and Economic 
Cooperation Forum; and the accession of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions’. 
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The AGOA statement of policy is important for a number of reasons, namely, it gives insight 
into US policy as it relates to SSA nations, and it outlines the basis on which the USA must at 
all times interact with the SSA nations.  
In the relevant parts, section 104 (Eligibility Requirements) of AGOA states that –  
‘The President is authorized to designate a sub-Saharan African country as an eligible 
sub-Saharan African country if the President determines that the country: 
(1) has established, or is making continual progress toward establishing, 
(A) a market-based economy that protects private property rights, incorporates an 
open rules-based trading system, and minimizes government interference in the 
economy through measures such as price controls, subsidies, and government 
ownership of economic assets;  
(B) the rule of law, political pluralism, and the right to due process, a fair trial, and 
equal protection under the law;  
(C) the elimination of barriers to United States trade and investment, including by— (i) 
the provision of national treatment and measures to create an environment conducive 
to domestic and foreign investment; (ii) the protection of intellectual property; and (iii) 
the resolution of bilateral trade and invest disputes…’ 
Hickel215 is of the view that US policy, part of which is contained in section 104 (Eligibility 
Requirements), contains a great deal of rhetoric, in that it makes references to reform 
measures and other governance issues that are not strictly adhered to by the USA in practice. 
Hickel216 uses the example of Chad who enjoy AGOA eligibility notwithstanding their history 
of corruption and tradition of arbitrary detentions and extra-judicial killings. Hickel argues 
that Chad enjoys AGOA eligibility due to its strategic oil alliance with Cameroon, which has 
culminated in the two countries being net exporters of oil to the USA.217 Another feature of 
USA policy and enforcement are the inconsistencies in the application and enforcement of 
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the AGOA eligibility criteria. To elaborate on this point, countries such as Chad and Cameroon 
and Eritrea all enjoy AGOA eligibility, notwithstanding that they fall short on the political, 
economic, and human rights fronts, having violated these standards on multiple occasions. 
The Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, 2016 writes extensively on the poor investment 
climate that prevails in Chad and reports that Chad suffers from corruption and is rated 147 
out of 168, in the TI Corruption Perceptions Index for 2015.218  In contrast, a much smaller 
and much less influential Swaziland lost out on its AGOA eligibility due to its alleged failure to 
resolve worker’s rights issues.219 This is notwithstanding that Swaziland has been a top 
exporter under AGOA, the 5th largest with the exclusion of energy products, in 2014.220 This 
chapter argues that the only reasonable inference to be drawn here, is that Chad’s favourable 
position with AGOA eligibility is primarily attributable to the fact that it exports crude oil, a 
resource of huge strategic importance to the USA. This chapter argues that Swaziland, on the 
other hand lacks the strategic importance enjoyed by Chad, in that it exported textiles to the 
USA, a product that is in fact market sensitive.221 The decision to exclude Swaziland from 
AGOA was thus easier and far less contentious than it would have been to exclude the 
strategically significant Chad or Cameroon. 
It is also important to point out that certain provisions in AGOA contain FTA type wording, 
such as section 104222, paragraphs (C)(i), (ii) and (iii). This is significant for a number of 
reasons, firstly, AGOA only makes reference to the possibility of negotiating FTAs and there is 
no promise of the USA entering into these. Secondly AGOA is a unilateral223 arrangement and 
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not a reciprocal one. Therefore, any provisions implying or expressing reciprocity are out of 
kilter with the stated purpose. Thirdly, having FTA224 wording in a unilateral agreement brings 
into question the USA’s true intentions. With respect to the third point, Bhala225 makes the 
observation that, the eligibility criteria226 are found in multilateral treaties whereas AGOA is 
a unilateral, discretional programme.227 Bhala therefore, supports the view that the eligibility 
criteria in AGOA seem out of place. It is however, unfortunate that he does not provide any 
detailed reasoning to this effect. Kennedy228 bemoans the fact that by linking AGOA benefits 
to market access for goods, services, capital and to Intellectual Property Rights Protection, 
the conditionality requirements introduce elements of reciprocity not meant for a unilateral 
arrangement such as AGOA.  Hickel229 argues that the conditionality requirements, in 
particular, the ones requiring that AGOA beneficiaries eliminate barriers to USA trade, 
constitute mild economic deregulation. Furthermore, Hickel230 argues that the AGOA 
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conditionality requirements, ‘constitute outright destruction of any and all tariff protections, 
flinging open African markets to a flood of American goods that inevitably undermine local 
industry’.  
This chapter argues that it is by no coincidence that these eligibility criteria made it onto 
AGOA, but rather, this was a well thought out strategy by the USA. It is necessary at this point 
to outline some of the general features of FTAs with the purpose of showing why such 
provisions do not belong in a unilateral arrangement such as AGOA. Furthermore, by 
highlighting these features, the intentions of the USA in inserting this wording into AGOA can 
hopefully be better understood.  
From the perspective of developing countries, Taylor points out a number of problems that 
are caused by USA type FTAs. According to Taylor231 FTAs recognize that developing countries 
often receive high levels of duty free access to USA markets and so, ‘claw-back’ these 
preferences through requirements for reciprocity. Taylor232 also points out that developing 
countries are historically without sufficient leverage to enter developed country markets and 
as such are unable to exploit the greatest trade benefits. The developing countries’ lack of 
leverage is amplified by the fact that the USA refuses to negotiate on issues that would grant 
easier access to agricultural markets.233 Furthermore, Taylor points out that developing 
countries lose traction with their own domestic policies when they accept USA FTAs. 
Investment restrictions, government procurement policies, intellectual property rights (IPRs) 
and the subsidization of exports are some of the policies that are adversely affected by USA 
FTAs.234 According to Al Nasa’235 in her commentary on the Jordan-US FTA (JUSFTA), the 
stringent IPR clauses in JUSFTA are a cause for concern and are akin to ‘TRIPS Plus’ provisions 
in that they grant more IPR protections than what is to be found in the WTO’s Agreement on 
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Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.236 According to Stevens237 there is not 
enough evidence available to show a link between FTAs and policy adjustments that 
developing countries make pursuant to FTAs. Stevens238 holds the view that there is a 
tendency to attribute policy shifts to the adoption of FTAs is often misleading. This chapter 
argues that Stevens’ views fail to take into account the simple fact that FTAs more often than 
not, require the beneficiary country to make various reforms, such as eliminating tariffs on 
substantially all the trade between the participating countries within a reasonable length of 
time.239 
Section 116(a) (Declaration of Policy) of AGOA,240 states the following –  
‘Congress declares that free trade agreements should be negotiated, where feasible, 
with interested countries in sub-Saharan Africa, in order to serve as the catalyst for 
increasing trade between the United States and sub-Saharan Africa and increasing 
private sector investment in sub-Saharan Africa’. 
The above section is relevant to this chapter because a plain reading of the words captured, 
clearly shows that the reciprocity which is common place in free trade agreements (FTAs) was 
not intended to form part of AGOA. Rather, what was intended by Congress was that where 
feasible, FTAs would be negotiated.241 It is important to also take notice that the word ‘should’ 
was preferred over the word ‘must’, indicating that the negotiation and conclusion of FTAs 
was not a guaranteed event, but was rather contingent on a number of other events taking 
their course, such as successful negotiations with affected SSA nations’ governments.242 
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Section 116(b)(1)243 of AGOA states the following –  
‘In general – The President, taking into account the provisions of the treaty establishing 
the African Economic Community and the willingness of the governments of sub-
Saharan African countries to engage in negotiations to enter into free trade 
agreements, shall develop a plan for the purpose of negotiating and entering into one 
or more trade agreements with interested beneficiary sub-Saharan African countries’.  
In the relevant parts, section 116(F)(iv)244 states that the Plan contemplated under section 
116(b) of AGOA must contain procedures that make it possible to cater for –  
‘adequate consultations with the relevant African governments and African regional 
and sub-regional intergovernmental organizations during the negotiation of the 
agreement or agreements’. 
With respect to the FTAs and in particular section 116245 of AGOA, on 4 November 2002, the 
USTR, Robert Zoellick notified Congress of the Administration’s intention to proceed with 
negotiations for an FTA with the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), which is comprised 
of Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho, South Africa and Swaziland.246 The first round of negotiations 
in respect of the SACU FTA commenced on 3 June 2003, in Johannesburg. The negotiations 
were characterised by a series of delays and US scepticism,247which was founded upon fear 
of the effect the SACU FTA would have on US business, US job losses, and the lack of 
transparency especially in SA government procurement procedures.248 With hardly any 
noticeable progress, the negotiations for a SACU FTA were suspended in April 2006. This 
chapter argues that the delays in negotiating and finalizing FTAs, together with the reasons 
resulting in these delays, has cast further doubt on the viability of concluding FTAs with SSA 
nations. This chapter further argues that the credibility that the whole negotiating process as 
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it relates to FTAs has also suffered. 
This chapter argues that the manner in which the USA aggressively pushed for reciprocity, 
rendered free trade an enemy unto itself and not an ally unto itself, as warned by Bhagwati.249 
Based on a strict reading of AGOA, it appears that reciprocity of trade with SA was not a 
priority but rather it was an item for negotiation at a later stage. In pushing for reciprocity in 
the manner that it did, the USA failed to appreciate the position of SA as a developing country, 
and as such was unable to negotiate reciprocity gradually and in a manner that would not 
require SA to make concessions that may compromise certain of its domestic industries. 
 
3.5 POULTRY DISPUTES BETWEEN THE USA AND SA 
At this point it is necessary to give a brief overview of the poultry industries of the USA and 
SA. This overview will hopefully place the poultry disputes between the USA and SA into 
context. 
According to Ncube, the SA poultry industry is a net importer of poultry products and as such, 
has a trade deficit of approximately US$270 million, or approximately 15 per cent of local 
demand.250 Ncube’s assessments are supported by Esterhuizen251 who states that SA 
imported 436 000 tons of broiler meat in 2015. Furthermore, according to Ncube, SA’s trade 
deficit position is in part as a result of SA not producing some of poultry’s key inputs such as 
oil cakes which are imported from South America and the EU, and soya. 
In contrast, according to the AGOA implementation subcommittee’s representations to the 
United States Trade Representative Trade Policy Staff Committee, the USA is one of the most 
efficient poultry producers in the world.252 The AGOA implementation subcommittee relies 
on the fact that the USA produces in the region of 19 million Metric Tonnes of poultry per 
year, the value of which was US$38 million in 2014.253 
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Based on the above, it is clear that compared to SA, the USA poultry industry yields far greater 
economic power and influence than SA. This begs the question, given that the USA has one of 
the biggest poultry exporting economies in the world, then why was it so important for it to 
secure a mere 65 000 ton per annum quota into the SA poultry market? The AGOA 
implementation committee also holds the view that the 65 000 ton per annum quota is small, 
representing only 3.7 percent of domestic consumption. The committee points out that the 
USA was nevertheless willing to accept the quota in the interest of resuming AGOA talks, but 
also saw the acceptance of this quota as a way of starting trade discussions afresh. 
Having given an overview of the poultry industries of each of the USA and SA, this chapter will 
focus on the poultry anti-dumping dispute of 1991 between the USA and SA, and the more 
recent poultry disputes between the USA and SA. The difference between the poultry dispute 
of 1991 and the more recent AGOA poultry disputes is that, the 1991 dispute primarily 
involved the correct application of anti-dumping laws.254 In contrast, the more recent disputes 
have primarily involved whether SA should remain as an AGOA beneficiary, considering that 
it was allegedly in breach of various AGOA conditionality requirements. Discussing the various 
disputes between these countries is necessary for this chapter because these disputes give 
insight into the differing policy stances of the USA and SA. Furthermore, it will be shown that 
historically, the USA and SA poultry disputes are no different in principle, from more recent 
trade disputes between the USA and SA, in that the USA has at all times pursued a bargaining 
position at odds with the law and international trade policy. 
In the year 1999 the Southern African Poultry Association (SAPA), together with Rainbow 
Farms approached the South African Board on Tariffs and Trade (SA BTT) in pursuit of a 
dumping255 investigation as it related to the importation of chicken leg quarters from the 
USA.256 After conducting an investigation based on the allegations brought forward, the SA 
BTT proceeded to impose an injunction on tariffs against the chicken leg quarters exported 
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by the USA to SA.257 Then, in 2000, the SA BTT finalized the anti-dumping duties after it 
concluded that the USA had dumped chicken leg quarters into the SA market and as a result, 
the SA poultry industry had experienced material injury.258 
One of the contentious points needing to be addressed as part of the matter was how the 
prices for brown meat259 and white meat, respectively, in relation to chickens for export were 
to be calculated. As could have been reasonably expected, the USA used a formula that it was 
familiar with, likewise, SA used a formula that it was familiar with.260 The SA BTT found that 
two USA exporters of chicken were involved in the dumping of dark chicken, by margins of 
209 percent and 357 percent, respectively.261 It is submitted that as a result of the SA BTT 
findings, the USA chicken export numbers fell to 307 000 USA Dollars in 2001 which was 
calculated to be a decline of 80 percent.262 
Kulkarni,263 Mankiw264 and Watson265 all argue that the BTT’s decision and subsequent 
implementation of antidumping duties against the USA were unfair due to the allegedly 
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incorrect formula used by the BTT. Viljoen266 argues that anti-dumping duties are a valid trade 
remedy that may be used in order to protect a domestic industry from the injury that can be 
caused by dumping practices by exporters. Viljoen further argues that in the event that there 
is dissatisfaction among exporters, arising from what they deem to be incorrect 
implementation of anti-dumping measures, then this ought to be raised with the WTO, 
through the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism.267 This chapter argues that having failed to 
raise their concerns through the WTO, it was disingenuous of the USA to cry foul of the SA 
BTT’s decision and subsequent implementation of anti-dumping duties. 
The more recent AGOA poultry dispute concerns whether SA should remain on the AGOA 
programme, considering that it refuses to remove anti-dumping duties levelled at USA 
poultry.268 The USA relies on section 104(C)269 of AGOA which provides for the following –  
 ‘the elimination of barriers to United States trade and investment, including by –  
(i) the provision of national treatment and measures to create an environment 
conducive to domestic and foreign investment; 
(ii) the protection of intellectual property; and 
(iii) the resolution of bilateral trade and investment disputes’. 
 
In essence, section 104(C)270 requires SA to forfeit its rights afforded by the WTO.271 
Furthermore, as has been alluded to earlier, section 104(C) is problematic because it is 
comprised of wording that is more common-place in FTAs. The AGOA wording envisioned that 
FTAs would strictly be subject to negotiations and the inputs of African governments. The 
USA’s recent conduct, namely coercing SA into eliminating tariffs imposed on the USA, is at 
odds with what AGOA envisioned. In coercing SA as described, the USA made the FTA 
provisions in AGOA, which were never meant to be included in the first place, immediately 
enforceable. This notwithstanding that no negotiations with African governments had 
                                                          
266AGOA deliberations – removal of anti-dumping duties or a loss of duty free access? Available at, 
https://www.tralac.org/discussions/article/7245-agoa-deliberations-removal-of-anti-dumping-duties-or-a-loss-
of-duty-free-access.html. Accessed on April 2015. 
267Ibid (fn 266). 
268Ibid (fn 269). 
269Section 104 (Eligibility Requirements), 19 U.S.C 3702. The African Growth and Opportunity Act, 2000. 
270Ibid (fn 269). 
271Ibid (fn 269). 
64 
 
authorised this approach.   This chapter argues that these factors support the view that the 
USA has abused the section 104 AGOA eligibility criteria.  
 
From the perspective of the USA, section 104 (C) of AGOA has yielded results in that the 
Department of Trade and Industry allocated a quota on USA imported bone-in-chicken.272 The 
effect of the quota is that the USA will be entitled to a Most Favoured Nation tariff of 37%, 
for 65 000273 tons per annum, of poultry imported by SA. The quota came into effect on April 
2016, will lapse on March 2017 and will be split up so that 16250 tons are allocated for each 
quarter, until the lapsing date. This thesis argues that, in light of the fact that AGOA is a 
unilateral arrangement, in terms where the beneficiary nation is not required to reciprocate, 
the 65 000 tons per annum quota granted to the USA is significant. This thesis further argues 
that the USA flouted the AGOA policy statement when it aggressively pushed for this quota. 
As stated elsewhere in this thesis, AGOA only contemplated that reciprocity discussions with 
SSA nations would take place at a later stage. There is nothing in AGOA stating that the USA 
would at any point in time have a right to call for reciprocity. This thesis argues that the 
approach adopted by the USA contradicted AGOA, was heavy handed, and was not befitting 
of a nation that prides itself on respecting the rule of law.274 
 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
The contribution of this chapter to this thesis is as follows. Reciprocity with SSA countries was 
only stated as an objective that at some stage would be negotiated between the USA and SSA 
countries, it was never the default position.275 There is no support in policy or otherwise for 
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the USA to demand reciprocity under AGOA, in the manner that they did during the recent 
AGOA poultry disputes. This thesis argues that the best way in terms of written policy and law 
for the USA to pursue reciprocity, would have been through FTAs with SSA countries and in 
particular, SA. These however were never concluded due to the reasons that have already 
been outlined. 
 
This chapter identifies the policy goals of AGOA and how these have been implemented, in 
this regard, the section 104 (C) eligibility criteria inserted in AGOA are criteria that are 
common-place in FTAs and not unilateral agreements such as AGOA. In fact, AGOA only 
contemplated that FTAs may be negotiated with SSA countries at a later stage, therefore, it is 
surprising that FTA type obligations found their way onto the AGOA statute. This also raises 
questions about USA transparency and good faith. Furthermore, section 104 (C) eligibility 
criteria have required that SA forfeit their rights in terms of WTO law, an indictment on a 
country requiring that SSA countries submit themselves to the Rule of Law.276 This chapter 
argues that negotiating poultry FTAs in accordance with the provisions in AGOA would have 
been a far more transparent approach by the USA, and would have been consistent with the 
policy goals and provisions contained in AGOA. On this point, this chapter argues that 
negotiating FTAs was not convenient enough for the USA as they were rapidly losing market 
share to the EU, who had recently concluded EPAs with SA.277 It was far more convenient for 
the USA to force SA to poultry concessions, instead of negotiating reform that could have 
been beneficial in the long run, to both the USA and SA.278 
 
This chapter also outlined that the USA’s poultry industry is far bigger in size, economic power, 
and influence when compared to that of SA’s poultry industry. Even taking into account the 
reasoning offered by the AGOA implementation committee, as to why the USA pushed so 
hard for a mere 65 000 ton per annum quota, it doesn’t make sense that a powerhouse like 
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the USA poultry industry, would flout its own policies, the rule of law, and its own reputation, 
for a 3.7 percent stake in the SA poultry imports market. 
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CHAPTER FOUR – CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis detailed the history of developing countries within the GATT system, with the aim 
of understanding firstly, what the position of developing countries in the multilateral trading 
system was, and secondly, how this developed over the years, through the various trade 
negotiation rounds. This was necessary because without understanding what developing 
countries negotiated for in the various trading rounds, it is near impossible to understand why 
they have objected to the trade demands of developed countries, as evidenced in AGOA.  It 
also then becomes nearly impossible to appreciate the difficult and often compromised 
position of developing countries vis-à-vis developed countries. 
This thesis documented the relationship between the USA, SA and SSA nations, from a policy 
perspective, with the aim of appreciating the policies that informed USA trade with SA and 
SSA nations. This was necessary to ascertain whether USA policy has been adhered to or 
deviated from during the recent AGOA poultry disputes. This chapter will also rely on the 
policy positions of the USA outlined in AGOA, the GSP and various policy makers, in order to 
show whether the USA deviated from its own policy positions and ultimately abused the 
application of the AGOA statute. 
4.2 CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis found that the USA deviated from its own stated policies, articulated by Bill Clinton, 
the GSP system and AGOA. At the outset, trade with SA and SSA was intended to foster a 
better trade environment and relationship to the benefit of the USA and SA. It was never the 
initial intention that the USA would force SA into reciprocating USA trade. The AGOA 
statement of policy supports these arguments, in particular section 103(4), which states that, 
‘Congress supports negotiating reciprocal and mutually beneficial trade agreements, including 
the possibility of establishing free trade areas that serve the interests of both the United States 
and the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa’.279 It is clear from the quotation that the intention 
of US policy makers was to make reciprocity a subject for negotiation and that there would 
have to be a separate agreement outlining these negotiated reciprocity provisions. AGOA is 
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clearly not the agreement intended to speak to reciprocity and how this would at all times be 
applied. 
The research found that it is important to understand the negotiating positions of both 
developed and developing countries in order to understand why the USA and SA have 
conducted themselves the way that they have during the AGOA poultry disputes. This dispute 
required and very much still requires a great deal of thorough analysis because of both the 
political and economic impact it has especially for a developing nation like South Africa.  In 
particular this thesis concludes that, the various trade negotiating rounds set the scene for 
trade between the developed world and the developing world. Developing countries were 
from the onset, required to convince the developed countries that they had special needs, 
and why these special needs should be recognized. Further, it was also noted that developing 
countries lacked apathy from developed countries who seemed intent on ignoring the 
developmental needs of developing countries. This is notwithstanding that developed 
countries sought to adopt protectionist measures in order to protect their domestic 
industries, at the expense of developing countries.280 The mandate of developing countries 
was nobler in nature as they sought, from the negotiating rounds, recognition of their special 
needs supplemented with legal mechanisms that would help advance their needs.281 Yet 
developed countries continuously sought to delegitimize the special needs of developing 
countries, even going as far as caricaturing developing countries as non-conformists. 
This thesis showed with reference to the recent poultry disputes that, not much has changed 
in trade relations between the developed world and the developing world. In particular, the 
manner in which the USA has conducted itself with SA in respect of AGOA, is no different from 
the various negotiating rounds. In demanding reciprocity under a unilateral arrangement such 
as AGOA, and inserting FTA type wording in AGOA, the USA contradicted its own policies some 
of which are clearly spelt out in AGOA.282 The USA also displayed the type of apathy that it 
displayed during the ITO negotiations, where it consistently declined to recognize the special 
needs of developing countries.  
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This thesis argued that it is of utmost importance in the first place to understand why the USA 
decided to trade in SA. The reasons quoted by Clinton in his letter to Congressman Rangel 
were in the main based on a developmental agenda and principles founded on good 
governance.283 This thesis concludes that from a policy perspective, it is not clear that the USA 
sought to derive maximum profits through trade with SA. Therefore, the shift that saw the 
USA looking to derive maximum profits from SA, through demanding reciprocity, was not 
transparent, appeared heavy handed and seemed to not be in-line with stated US policy 
reflected in AGOA.284 
This thesis analysed AGOA and in particular, the various provisions containing conditionality 
requirements. This was necessary to answer the question of whether the AGOA conditionality 
requirements lend themselves to abuse at the instance of the USA. In particular, this thesis 
analysed the following AGOA conditionality requirements, requiring the following from SSA 
nations –  
‘(C) the elimination of barriers to United States trade and investment, including by— 
(i) the provision of national treatment and measures to create an environment 
conducive to domestic and foreign investment;  
(ii) the protection of intellectual property; and 
 (iii) the resolution of bilateral trade and invest disputes…’ 
Throughout the analysis, it became apparent that the AGOA conditionality requirements lend 
themselves to abuse because they are vague, lack commercial meaning and in any event are 
FTA type clauses that should have never made their way onto the AGOA statute. As such, the 
vagaries of the conditionality requirements have only played into the hands of the USA, 
because there has been no guidance on, for example the provisions requiring that SSA 
countries eliminate all barriers to USA trade, and how these are to be appropriately 
applied.285 South Africa’s anti-dumping measures levelled at USA poultry exports are legal and 
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form part of WTO law, therefore these should not be construed as ‘barriers to Unites States 
trade and investment’.  
This thesis also observed that there is a lack of consistency when it comes to applying the full 
might of conditionality requirements. This thesis established that the USA has continued to 
grant AGOA eligibility to countries, even where such countries continuously display their 
inability to keep in touch with the political, economic and law reforms that are required in 
terms of AGOA.286 This thesis used the examples of Chad and Cameroon, who have terrible 
track records when it comes to human rights violations and corruption, as well as poor 
political stability. It was argued that Chad continues to enjoy AGOA eligibility primarily 
because of its status as oil exporters, a resource of significant strategic importance to the USA. 
In contrast, this thesis made the observation that a smaller country, Swaziland, had its AGOA 
eligibility benefits taken away, on account of alleged worker’s rights issues. This thesis argued 
that removing Swaziland from the AGOA programme was likely less contentious due to the 
fact that Swaziland exported textiles, a product that in any event is noted as a sensitive one 
under AGOA. This thesis further argued that, taking AGOA eligibility away from either 
Cameroon or Chad would have been far more contentious, due to the strategic importance 
of the oil that they both export under AGOA. 
As for the FTA nature of the conditionality requirements, this thesis argued that this has also 
played into the hands of the USA and has lent itself to abuse at the instance of the USA, 
because instead of FTAs being negotiated as set out in AGOA, these provisions were instead 
enforced prematurely, by the USA.287 This thesis concludes that this was no coincidence as 
negotiating FTAs with SSA countries would have taken the USA many years, effectively putting 
the USA out of the race with the EU for SSA countries market share.288 It was therefore, 
strategic and opportunistic for the USA to enforce these FTA provisions without undergoing 
FTA negotiations as provided for in the AGOA statement of policy. 
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It would be naïve to suggest that AGOA has not been beneficial to SA trade, however, there 
are a number of issues that need to be addressed to ensure that AGOA yields even better 
trade results between the USA and SA and that the trade relationship between these two 
nations is enhanced. The issues requiring further thought and attention will be discussed 
below. 
 
Unilateral Trade Arrangements 
Unilateral trade arrangements have their origins in the Haberler Report, GATT and the 
General System of Preferences, and therefore, these arrangements are absent any 
arbitrariness and are not the concoctions of developing countries. This being the case, to the 
extent that the USA no longer sees unilateral arrangements such as AGOA as being beneficial 
to the USA, then the AGOA Forum289 should be used as a platform to tackle this stance. It is 
however, not conducive to fostering a healthy trade environment if the USA sees fit to resolve 
its issues by way of heavy handed tactics, which include threats of AGOA expulsion. 
 
Free Trade Agreements 
This thesis made the observation that AGOA contains FTA type wording which does not 
belong in AGOA, but rather, is suited to an FTA. Furthermore, if one considers that the USA 
seeks more ‘meaningful’ trade with SSA nations290 and sees AGOA as not being the long-term 
solution for trade with SSA nations, then the resumption of the FTA negotiations that were 
aborted in the year 2006, would be appropriate. These negotiations would allow the USA to 
make representations on how it would like for trade with SSA nations to be improved. For 
example, setting the parameters for reciprocal trade. Likewise, SSA nations would be 
presented with an opportunity to make rebuttal representations to the USA, on amongst 
                                                          
289Section 105 (United States-Sub Saharan Africa Trade and Economic Cooperation Forum) of AGOA, 19 U.S.C 
3702. The African Growth and Opportunity Act, 2000. This United States-Sub Saharan Africa Trade and Economic 
Cooperation Forum, is also referred to as the AGOA Forum. 
290Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S. Trade Representative, Michael Froman., ‘Beyond AGOA 




other things, reciprocal trade. From the perspective of the SSA nations, the negotiations 
would be required to take into account the developmental states of SSA nations. From the 
perspective of the USA, the negotiations would be required to take into account that 
unilateral trade is one sided and this is not sustainable, nor is it conducive to building strong 
trade relations.  
 
Further Amendments to AGOA 
This thesis argued that some of the eligibility requirements contained in AGOA lend 
themselves to abuse at the instance of the USA. In particular, this thesis argued that the 
condition requiring that SSA nations eliminate barriers to USA trade is problematic because 
there is no guidance on what was meant by the chosen words. It was also argued that this 
condition is contentious because in effect, it requires of an AGOA beneficiary to forgo its WTO 
rights. This condition is better off deleted, to the extent that the USA is of the view that certain 
protectionist measures are unlawfully implemented by an SSA nation, then it should enforce 
its rights at WTO level.  
 
Beyond AGOA 
AGOA comes to an end in the year 2025, this gives the USA and all AGOA beneficiaries just 
under 10 years to formulate ideas on what the next steps will be at the termination date and 
beyond. There is broad consensus that AGOA, although beneficial, is not the long-term 
solution for the USA and SSA nations. To this end, AGOA beneficiaries and the USA should 
make use of the AGOA forum to discuss the way forward as it relates to the fast-approaching 
expiry date of AGOA. This discussion should form part of the agenda each time the AGOA 
Forum convenes. It is proposed that some of the long-term solutions, once AGOA has expired 
could be well negotiated, fair and balanced FTAs, and special preferences for those nations 
that on economic grounds, are not ready for an expansive FTA are better suited to more 
mature economies. Special programmes could be designed for SSA nations to focus purely on 
exports of manufactured goods and value-added agricultural products with the objective of 





From Net Importer of Poultry to Net Exporter of Poultry 
With SA being a net importer of poultry there exists an opportunity to balance-out the trade 
deficit and ultimately turn this into a trade surplus. To achieve this, SA would have to become 
a net producer of poultry which would require among other things, better efficiencies within 
the poultry market’s value chains, and solutions to ensure that maize costs and oil cake costs 
do not drive up the production costs of poultry more than what is necessary.291 Conclusively, 
working towards this position would provide SA with an opportunity to integrate its poultry 
market into global markets, and thereby, creating further job opportunities for SA citizens. 
 
  
                                                          
291Ncube P., ‘Development of the animal feed to poultry value chain across Botswana, South Africa, and 
Zimbabwe’. United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research. Page 2. 2016. The 
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